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UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE “MISAPPROPRIATION 
DOCTRINE”—A RENEWED ANALYSIS 
MIGUEL DEUTCH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual products are primary business assets in the modern economies 
of contemporary times, now customarily described as the “information age.”1  
Competitive advantages expand and decline in accordance with the degree to 
which such products are unique and might be used.  Accordingly, the law must 
consider the manner and level of protection to be accorded to intellectual 
products in order to prevent the improper attenuation of these advantages. 
Protection of intellectual products poses complex legal challenges to the 
assorted interests involved in this field.  Countering the need to protect the fruit 
of the developer’s labor, that is, resisting the protection required by the “labor 
theory” of property law,2 are powerful public and constitutional interests: 
freedom of occupation, freedom of competition, freedom of expression,3 and 
the substantial public interest in an expansive and uninhibited flow of ideas 
and know-how.4  The protection of intellectual property rights in the various 
 
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Tel-Aviv University; Manager of Israeli Institute for 
Continuing Legal Studies; Principal Researcher and Draftsman, Committee for Codification of 
Israeli Civil Law headed by Chief Justice Aharon Barak. 
 1. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting 
Trade Secret Information: A Plan for Proactive Strategy, 43 BUS. LAW. 887, 887 (1988); Pamela 
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 367 (1989). 
 2. For this theory, see, for example, LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 65 (1977); Edward Andrew, Inalienable Right, Alienable Property 
and Freedom of Choice: Locke, Nozick and Marx on the Alienability of Labour, 18 CAN. J. POL. 
SCI. 529 (1985); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1203, 1212-1218 (1998); Don Wiesner & Anita Cava, Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 
MD. L. REV. 1076, 1101-2 (1988). 
 3. This also includes freedom of commercial speech.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748 (1975); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, 
Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990); Edward J.  Eberle, Practical 
Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411 (1992). 
 4. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, 
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legal systems is subject to diverse qualifications not characteristic of tangible 
property.  Thus, the period of validity of the right is restricted5 and several 
theories enable its weakening, such as the concept of fair use in copyright law,6 
the institution of compulsory licenses in patent and copyright law,7 and the 
defense of public policy in trade secrets law.8  These concepts rely on the 
public interest, which requires limits to be placed on the protection of the 
owner in order to enable society and the economy to advance.  The “Internet 
Era” has created a new social and cultural atmosphere that encourages the free 
flow of ideas,9 thereby supporting development of new bodies of knowledge.  
Yet, the intolerable ease with which information is disseminated on the internet 
creates a substantial threat to the exclusivity of the developer of a new 
 
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 990-993 
(1997); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965 (1990). 
 5. Thus, for example, the period of validity of a patent in the American system is twenty 
years.  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).  The period of validity of a design is ten years.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 1305 (2000). 
 6. See infra note 95. 
 7. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 497 (Rev. 3d ed. 1993); ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
POLICY 69 (1997); Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and 
Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (1977).  American 
law regularly prefers to protect the public interest in preventing misuse of intellectual property 
rights by applying the doctrine of “misuse defense.”  For this doctrine, see 1 PAUL ROSENBERG, 
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS (2d ed., 1986) [hereinafter ROSENBERG]; Ralph D. Clifford, 
Simultaneous Copyright and Trade Secrets Claims: Can the Copyright Misuse Defense Prevent 
Constitutional Doublethink?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 247, 258-71 (2000).  For the Israeli law on 
compulsory licenses, see 2E JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 2, 26-30 
(1987). 
 8. For the American law, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, 
reporters’ note, cmt. c (1995).  For English law, see Lion Laboratories v. Evans, 1985 Q.B. 526; 
ROBERT DEAN, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 283-84 (1990). 
 9. For the theory that social and cultural planning goals should shape intellectual property, 
see the “just and attractive culture” approach.  RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE 
CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 
(1998); W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998). 
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intellectual product10 and may destroy property such as trade secrets without 
any great effort being exerted.11 
The “institutionalized” intellectual property laws (patent law, designs, 
copyright law, etc.) create a comprehensive framework of arrangements that 
provide a system of internal balances between the interests involved.  
Inevitably, this system is incomplete.  First, it is trite to mention that legislation 
generally lags far behind new technologies, and this is particularly true in 
contemporary life when one looks at the accelerated pace of developments.12  
Second, it is not always worthwhile from the vantage point of the developer of 
the intellectual product to invest in the registration fees needed to protect the 
product, particularly if the product will only be relevant for a short period of 
time.13  Third, the internal balances of the institutionalized intellectual property 
law may transform the institutionalized channel into one that fails to provide 
adequate protection for the product in cases where a particular component 
essential according to that channel is missing.  In such cases, there may still be 
justification for considering the establishment of an alternative system of 
balances, fitting the level of protection that should properly be accorded in the 
particular instance. 
The question arises, in cases where misappropriation of an intellectual 
product does not violate an institutionalized intellectual property law, whether 
it would nonetheless be justified to prohibit misappropriation by virtue of a 
 
 10. For the need to adjust the various intellectual property laws to the Internet age, see, 
among the numerous sources, G. PETER ALBERT, JR. ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN 
CYBERSPACE (2d prtg. 2000); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD (1995); Dan L. 
Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Trademark 
Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998); John F. Delaney & 
Robert Murphy, The Law of the Internet: A Summary of U.S. Internet Caselaw and Legal 
Developments, 570 PRAC. L. INST. 169, 184 (1998); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in 
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217; Scott S. Kokka, Property Rights on an Intranet, 3 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (Spring 1998). 
 11. For original proposals regarding the manner in which trade secrets law should cope with 
the challenges posed by the cyberspace era, including the proposal to protect the rights of the 
owner of the information in certain circumstances, notwithstanding publication of the secret on 
the Internet, see Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the Information Age: Can Trade Secret Law 
Survive the Internet, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1151; Matthew R. Millikin, 
www.misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets after Mass Dissemination on the Internet, 
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 931 (2000). 
 12. For the difficulties faced by intellectual property law in adapting to new technologies, 
see R.C. DORR & C.H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS & 
TRADEMARKS 44 (2d ed. 1995); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2444-45 (1994).  For the general difficulties faced by the 
law when coping with the phenomenon of new technologies, see R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 
452 (5th ed. 1985). 
 13. Fashion designs would be an example of products that are relevant for a short period of 
time. 
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legal doctrine extraneous to the institutionalized channel.  This issue is a matter 
of profound controversy in American law, starting from the well-known ruling 
in International News Service v. Associated Press,14 which establish a concept 
that has been termed the “misappropriation doctrine.”  It was resolved in Israeli 
law in 1998, in a comprehensive and far-ranging judgment delivered by the 
Supreme Court of Israel by a special bench of seven justices, in the ASHIR 
case.15  The objective of this article is to analyze this case.  The lessons to be 
learned from the ASHIR ruling may contribute to the persisting debate in the 
American legal system concerning the justification for the misappropriation 
doctrine. 
II.  GENERAL PROHIBITION ON UNFAIR COMPETITION 
A. Existence of the Prohibition in Various Legal Systems 
Misappropriation of the intellectual product of another is an act generally 
carried out by a competitor of the developer of the product.  Misappropriation 
therefore raises direct and immediate questions in the area of unfair 
competition law. 
The existence of a general prohibition on unfair competition, which 
judicial rulings from time to time imbue with fresh meaning, is one of the 
important issues of business law in every legal system.  While only a few 
would dispute the fundamental justification for establishing concrete 
prohibitions on specific unlawful competitive activities, the establishment of a 
general prohibition has not been the subject of uniform legal perception. Such 
a prohibition has been prescribed in German legislation,16 as well as other 
countries in Europe. 17  In England, the legal literature traditionally stated that 
the law does not recognize the general tort of unfair competition.18  Yet, in 
recent years, it has become possible to discern other views and see the cautious 
 
 14. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 15. Application for Leave to Appeal [A.L.A.] 5768/94, ASHIR Import, Manufacture and 
Dissemination v. Forum Ltd., 52(4) P.D. 289 [hereinafter A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 
289]. 
 16. German Unfair Competition Law § 1 (1909) (Gestzes Gegen denUnlauteren 
Wettbewerb). 
 17. See, e.g., Italian Civil Code, C.c. § 2598.  In France, there is no specific legislation on 
this matter, however, a general prohibition on unfair competition is inferred from the general 
prohibition on wrongfully causing damage.  See French Code Civil, C. CIV. § 1382.  For the 
legislation in different countries, see CHRISTINE FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PROTECTION 
FOR INDUSTRIAL DESIGN (1985). 
 18. See Associated Newspapers Plc. v. Insert Media Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 900, 909 (Ch. D. 1990); 
Cadbury-Schweppes Pty. Ltd. v. The Pub Squash Co. Ltd., 1981 R.P.C. 429, 461-464; DAVID 
YOUNG, PASSING OFF 9-10 (2d ed. 1989). 
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beginnings of an acknowledgement of such a tort.19  A general prohibition on 
unfair competition may be found in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Proposal Rights (TRIPS Agreement).20 
American law recognizes the existence of a general tort of unfair 
competition, as it is aware that it is impossible to set out a definitive list of 
forms of unfair competition.  Thus, it has justifiably been said that, “it would 
be impossible to draft in advance detailed plans and specifications of all acts 
and conduct to be prohibited . . . , since unfair or fraudulent business practices 
may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.”21 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets out the prohibited 
modes of unfair competition.  It mentions concrete forms of conduct—
commercial misrepresentation, infringement of trademarks and 
misappropriation of trade values.  Two additional broad spectrum provisions 
are mentioned that are capable of providing the basis for a general prohibition 
on unfair competition: cases in which statutory provisions or fundamental 
principles of common law impose liability and “other acts or practices of the 
actor determined to be actionable as an unfair method of competition, taking 
into account the nature of the conduct and its likely effect on both the person 
seeking relief and the public.”22 
B. The Revision of Unfair Competition Law in Israel 
Israeli legislation does not contain a general provision prohibiting unfair 
competition.  The Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version],23 the principal tort 
legislation in Israel, which was adopted from English law, does not contain a 
provision of this type.  In view of its absence in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 
Israeli case law has held on more than one occasion that there is no general 
 
 19. SALMOND & HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 556-558 (21st ed. 1996).  For the debate 
on this issue in English legal literature, wrestling, inter alia, with the issue of the extent to which 
the courts should regulate fair competition through judicial rulings, see PETER CANE, TORT LAW 
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS 193-196 (2d ed. 1996).  The author does not draw a definitive 
conclusion.  However, it seems that he favors case-by-case judicial rulings on this matter, made in 
a cautious and deliberate manner.  See id. 
 20. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, World Trade 
Organization, art. 10, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (Apr. 15, 1994). 
 21. People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1962).  See also Patricia V. Norton, The Effect of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention on 
American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 230 (1999) (quoting Mosk, 20 Cal. 
Rptr. at 521).  (Norton emphasizes the advantages of a flexible definition of the concept of unfair 
competition in such a manner so as to enable the court to reach a just result.  See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 1 cmt. g (1995).  For the development of 
American law on this issue, see 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, ch. 1 (2003). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995). 
 23. D.M.I. 10 (1968) [hereinafter Civil Wrongs Ordinance]. 
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prohibition on unfair competition.24  This approach is based on the perception 
that the list of torts in the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version] is a 
“numerus clausus” and not subject to judicial elaboration.25 
In 1999, the Commercial Torts Law26 was enacted in Israel, regulating a 
variety of aspects of unfair competition.27  This law does not contain a general 
prohibition on unfair competition, but does set out the following concrete torts 
arising from certain situations of unfair competition: passing off,28 false 
statement,29 unfairly restricting access to the business of another,30 and 
 
 24. See C.A. 352/69, Manhattan Co. Ltd. v. Hamegapher Ltd., 23(2) P.D. 373; C.A. 18/86, 
Israeli Finizia Glass Plants Ltd. v. Les Verreries de Saint Gobain, 45(3) P.D. 224; C.A. 347/90, 
SodaGal Ltd. v. Spilman, 47(3) P.D. 459, 477; C.A. 490/85, [Miscellaneous Applicatilns M.A. 
894/85, Jericho Salts Ltd. v. Dead Sea Plants Ltd., 39(3) P.D. 525, 528; C.A. 307/87, M. 
Weisbrod and Sons v. D.I.G. Elec. Prods. Factory, 44(1) P.D. 629, 634. 
 25. See C.A. 153/54, Vider v. The Attorney Gen., 7 P.D. 1246; C.A. 358/58, Dgani v. Solel 
Boneh Ltd., 11 P.D. 871, 875. 
 26. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999, S.H. 1709. 
 27. This author prepared the draft memorandum and bill for the Israeli Ministry of Justice 
and actively accompanied its enactment by the Israeli legislature. 
 28. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999, S.H. 1709, § 1.  This tort was previously established 
by Section 59 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance.  The new arrangement, to a certain extent, expands 
the parameters of the old tort, e.g., in relation to the prohibition on misleading customers as to the 
source of a service and not only to the source of a product.  See the analysis offered by MIGUEL 
DEUTCH, COMMERCIAL TORTS AND TRADE SECRETS 57-61 (2002). 
 29. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, § 2.  The tort provides an injured trader 
with a cause of action against another trader who knowingly made false misrepresentations 
regarding his own business or the business of the plaintiff.  In the past, a trader had a cause of 
action against another trader only if the latter made misrepresentations concerning the business of 
the plaintiff.  See Section 58 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version].  The assumption is 
that a false misrepresentation on the part of the defendant in relation to his own business gives 
him an unfair advantage over his competitors.  See DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 61-64. 
 30. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, § 3.  This tort arises in situations where, 
e.g., a domain name is registered that is similar to the name of the plaintiff’s business.  In this 
way, the defendant channels the customers to his own business, while making access to the 
plaintiff’s website more burdensome.  See C.A. (T.A.) 1627/01, M.S. Magnetics Ltd. v. Discopy 
(Israel) Ltd., 32(9) P.M. 354; DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 64-66.  In American law, owners of 
trademarks have often succeeded in such claims by virtue of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
of 1996, which prevents commercial “freeloading” on the plaintiff’s reputation in a way that may 
undermine the plaintiff’s association with the commercial name and dilute his reputation.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).  For this purpose, there is no need to show that customers have actually 
been misled.  See, e.g., Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.) Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 
1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 
Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entm’t Group Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash 1996).  
Today, protection is granted to owners of trademarks also by virtue of a new law, the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).  On occasion, 
claims were also based on infringement of the registered mark itself, when it was possible to 
show that customers might have been misled.  For additional case law and for an analysis of the 
various aspects of American law on this matter, see G. PETER ALBERT, JR. ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
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misleading consumers.31  Likewise, the Commercial Torts Law contains a 
chapter regulating the protection of trade secrets.32 
With certain modifications, the Commercial Torts Law adopts the principal 
elements of American law concerning the protection of trade secrets. Yet, it 
takes a more cautious approach than that followed by American law regarding 
the protection provided to the owner of the secret against third parties who 
subsequently become apprised of the secret following the original 
misappropriation.  The statute takes account of the harm caused to freedom of 
occupation and the flow of knowledge in society by the protection of a secret.  
Thus, for example, the protection conferred by Israeli law on the owner of the 
secret only applies when the third party subjectively knew or deliberately 
closed his eyes to the fact that the secret was misappropriated.33  In contrast, 
American law also imposes liability upon a third party who acted negligently.34  
Further, when the third party acquired the secret in good faith and for value, 
the rule in American law is that the third party nonetheless remains liable for 
misappropriation of the secret, even though the court has discretion to negate 
the defense.35  In the Israeli Commercial Torts Law, the opposite presumption 
is applied, i.e., the rule is that the third party is protected in this situation, save 
if the court negates his defense.36  The stance taken by Israeli law reflects the 
legislature’s reluctance to allow too severe an injury to be caused to 
competitiveness by protecting the intellectual products of the plaintiff, a stance 
 
PROPERTY LAW IN CYBERSPACE (2d prtg. 2000); David Romero, A Worldwide Problem: Domain 
Names Disputes in Cyberspace - Who is in Control?, 9 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 69 (2000). 
 31. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, § 27 (inserting § 31(a)(2) into the 
Consumer Protection Law, 5791-1981 S.H. 1023).  This provision confers a cause of action upon 
a trader, not only a consumer, in respect to acts that may mislead consumers.  The legal reasoning 
behind this section is that dealing in a manner so as to mislead the consumer confers an unfair 
advantage upon the misleading trader over the fair trader.  The defendant trader’s advantage is 
gained by drawing to himself customers who would otherwise have turned to the plaintiff.  For an 
analysis of this reasoning, see DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 47-50. 
 32. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, §§ 6-11. 
 33. See id. at § 6(b)(3). 
 34. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act §1(2)(ii), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1990) (defining 
“misappropriation”); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 972-973 (9th Cir. 
1991); Wright v. Palmer, 464 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE 
SECRETS LAW § 3.03(3)(b)(IV) (Melvin F. Jager ed., 2003); Thomas F. Cotter, Conflicting 
Interests in Trade Secrets, 48 FLA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(b) (1995). 
 36. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, § 8.  For an analysis of this provision, see 
DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 350-73.  By this, Israeli law resembles the law that prevailed in 
American jurisprudence in the past.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §758 (1939); 2 
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, §7.02[2].  See also, Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of 
Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 345 
(1998); Susan C. Miller, Florida’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 863, 877 
(1988). 
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that also led to the dismissal of a proposal to establish a general statutory 
prohibition on unfair competition that appeared in the bill.37 
Notwithstanding this cautious approach regarding the possible harm to 
competitiveness, one may discern a tendency in the Commercial Torts Law to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the remedies available for the various concrete 
torts.  Where the law assumes that it is on “firm ground” in prohibiting a 
certain form of conduct, and thus establishes a cause of action in respect to that 
conduct, it does not hesitate to afford aggressive remedies in order to 
strengthen efficiency.  The principal remedy in this connection is the Anton 
Piller order, available in English law,38 but adopted and applied in a more 
invasive manner by Israeli law.39  One of the remedies accorded to the 
aggrieved party is exemplary compensation, not requiring proof of damage.40  
This approach derives from the relatively low level of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in Israel. 
C. Does a General Tort of Unfair Competition Exist in Israeli Law? 
As noted above, Israeli case law has held that there is no general tort of 
unfair competition in Israeli law.  Yet, this judicial view did not rely on a 
value-laden perception regarding the lack of substantive justification for such a 
prohibition, but rather on a purely “factual” observation of the Civil Wrongs 
Ordinance [New Version], which did not disclose the explicit existence of such 
 
 37. Prohibition of Unfair Competition Bill, 5756-1996 H.H. 2471, §1.  Consequently, the 
title of the law was changed to the Commercial Torts Law.  Section One of the Bill proposed that 
“a trader shall not perform an act which is contrary to fair competition practices.”  Id. 
 38. See Anton Piller KG v. Mfg. Processes Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 162 (C.A. 1976); E.M.I. Ltd. v. 
Pandit, 1 W.L.R 302 (Ch. D. 1975).  See also Kern Alexander, The Mareva Injunction and Anton 
Piller Order: The Nuclear Weapons of English Commercial Litigation, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 487 
(1997); DEAN, supra note 8, at 449-478.  The Anton Piller remedy enables a party aggrieved by 
an infringement to demand the appointment of a receiver who will enter the premises of the 
defendant in order to locate assets infringing his rights and other evidence.  Id.  The remedy is 
primarily used in relation to the infringement of intellectual property rights. 
 39. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, §§ 16-20.  The Anton Piller remedy is 
supplied for the torts of passing off and misappropriation of trade secrets.  The uncompromising 
invasiveness of this remedy in the Commercial Torts Law is principally reflected in the power of 
the receiver to enter premises by force, accompanied by the police, should the defendant refuse to 
comply with an order requiring him to allow entry.  Id. at § 16(b).  On the other hand, English law 
(see 1 KEVIN M. GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 1039 (14th ed. 
1999)) and the general rules of procedure in Israel in relation to other matters (specifically Rule 
387d(a) of the Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure, 5744-1984, S.H. 5744, which were added to the 
Rules of Procedure following the enactment of the Commercial Torts Law) do not permit forcible 
entry into the defendant’s premises within the framework of the Anton Piller remedy.  K.T. 4685.  
Instead, the defendant runs the risk of being held in contempt of court should he refuse to comply 
with the order.  Rule 387d(a), § 12. 
 40. Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709, § 13. 
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a tort.  Before the ruling in ASHIR41—on which this article focuses—Israeli 
case law never considered the possibility that a tort of unfair competition could 
be eveloped through the tort of negligence.42 
In Israel, the tort of negligence also applies to acts having an intended 
outcome.43  This “framework tort,” which is infused with new meaning from 
time to time by judicial rulings, has been the subject of impressive 
development in recent decades.  It serves as a central device for elaborating 
legal norms in an infinite range of issues, when moral, social and economic 
considerations justify the imposition of liability upon the defendant.44  The 
preeminence of the tort of negligence in Israeli law was highlighted when the 
Israeli Supreme Court invoked this tort even when doing so led to a somewhat 
problematic circumvention of restrictions imposed on the cause of action by 
the concrete tort dealing with the given circumstances.45 
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether moral and economic 
considerations justify recognition of a general prohibition on unfair 
competition.  Given the aforementioned development of the tort of negligence 
in Israel, the answer to this question corresponds to the answer that should be 
given to the question of whether it would be proper to impose liability for 
unfair competition.  The tort of negligence is designed to transform what 
would be proper in terms of the imposition of liability, into what will actually 
prevail in the positive law. 
 
 41. A.L.A. 5768/94 ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289. 
 42. M. Deutch, The Exclusive Distributor and Protection of Goodwill, 20 MISHPATIM 525, 
532 (1991). 
 43. C.A. 732/80, Arens v. Beith El, 38(2) P.D. 645, 655; D. Mor, The Civil Wrongs 
Ordinance in the Light of 40 Years of Case Law, 39 HAPRAKLIT 344, 386-388 (1990). 
 44. See, e.g., Y. Gilad, On the Elements of the Tort of Negligence in Israeli Torts Law, 14 
IUNEI MISHPAT 319 (1989); Y. Gilad, On ‘Working Presumptions,’ Judicial Intuition and 
Rationality in Determining the Boundaries of Liability in Negligence, 26 MISHPATIM 295 (1996); 
A. Porat, Negligence and Interests, 24 IUNEI MISHPAT 275 (2001); see also infra Part III-D. 
 45. See C.A. 243/83, Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, 39(1) P.D. 113.  Thus, the tort of 
malicious prosecution in Section 60 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance provides a cause of action to 
a person injured by the institution of failed legal proceedings by the defendant.  The cause, as 
mentioned in Section 60 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance vests only if the legal proceedings have 
been prosecuted maliciously, i.e., with the knowledge that the proceedings are without probable 
cause and likely to fail.  The Israeli case law invoked the general tort of negligence in order to 
impose liability on the defendant even when the abortive proceedings were instituted negligently 
and not necessarily maliciously.  As to a matter that has some bearing on the discussion in this 
article, namely, unfair competition conducted by causing a party to a contract to breach the 
contract, the accepted view in Israeli legal literature is that even though the specific tort dealing 
with such behavior (Section 62 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance) requires that the act be performed 
knowingly, it might be possible to impose liability by virtue of the tort of negligence when the 
defendant did not know, but ought to have known that he was causing a breach.  See N. COHEN, 
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 302-338 (1982). 
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There is no need to elaborate on the moral factors in this context.  It is 
almost a tautology to state that unfair competition is morally improper.  
“Unfair” means valueless.  From this point of view, therefore, it is clear that 
competitive activities that are unfair are embraced by the prohibition in the tort 
of negligence.  Obviously, defining the contents of unfairness is not an easy 
task, however, there are activities that are indisputably fundamentally flawed, 
even if not concretely prohibited, such as situations in which a bidder bribes an 
employee of a tendering company to persuade the latter to prefer his bid over 
that of a competitor.46 
Yet, moral considerations are not the only factors to shape the contents of 
the tort of negligence and the prohibition of unfair competition.  Within the 
context of this shaping process, broader social and economic factors should be 
taken into account.47  Such factors may lead to a result whereby certain 
immoral activities are nonetheless permitted, in view of the social and 
economic price that would be incurred by imposing a prohibition on unfair 
competition. 
The influence of social and economic considerations should not be treated 
lightly in this context.  These considerations profoundly affect the law of 
competition.  A general restriction on unfair competition (as distinct from 
concrete prohibitions) would indeed embrace a range of situations in which the 
prohibition might be justified, but may also deter other activities that are 
desirable from a larger perspective.  It is certainly difficult to justify unfair 
conduct even if that unfair conduct promotes competitiveness and consumer 
interests, however, because the definition of unfairness is fluid and amorphous, 
a general prohibition may per se deter competition so that the public interest in 
the existence of free competition would be impaired.  This argument was 
voiced in debates held in the Israeli Knesset and was determinative in the 
decision to omit the general prohibition on unfair competition from the final 
version of the Commercial Torts Law, an omission that eventually led to a 
different title of the law than the one on the face of the bill.48  During the 
Knesset debates, this author objected to the omission of this central tort,49 and 
 
 46. The proposal to enact a special tort regarding such conduct in the Commercial Torts Law 
was not accepted.  See Prohibition on Unfair Competition Bill, 5756-1996 H.H. 2471, § 7.  Yet, 
this result did not ensue from the presumption that such activities are proper, but from difficulties 
in drafting the tort so that its scope would not also prohibit legitimate commercial practices in this 
field. 
 47. See generally Gilad, On ‘Working Presumptions,’ supra note 44; Porat, supra note 44.  
See also infra Part III-D. 
 48. See Prohibition of Unfair Competition Bill, 5756-1996 H.H. 2471, § 1.  See also supra 
note 37 and accompanying text. 
 49. See the comprehensive discussions on this issue in the records of the Sub-committee of 
the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset, which debated the previously 
mentioned Bill.  Record No. 1 of 25.6.98, at 1-12; Record No. 2 of 13.7.98, at 20-24. 
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is still of the opinion that it may be judicially developed within the framework 
of the tort of negligence, notwithstanding its omission from the Commercial 
Tort Law. 
Obviously, considerations of economic efficiency are not the only issues to 
bear in mind.  Even though Israeli legal literature in the last two decades has 
frequently suggested legal models based on “law and economics” concepts 
drawn from American jurisprudence,50 Israeli case law generally gives 
preference to moral considerations over efficiency considerations when the two 
clash.51  In relation to the matter at hand, the confrontation between moral and 
efficiency considerations could have been avoided if concrete prohibitions on 
 
 50. See, e.g., H. Dagan, The Entitlement to the Profits of Breach of Contract: An Anatomy of 
Judicial Legislation, 20 IUNEI MISHPAT 601 (1997); U. Procaccia, On Laws, Contracts and 
Things: An Economic Approach to Basic Jurisprudential Concepts, 18 MISHPATIM 395 (1988).  
See also Economic Analysis of Law, 22(3) MISHPATIM (1993). 
 51. See, e.g., A.L.A. 6339/97, Rocker v. Salomon, 45(1) P.D. 199.  The majority judges 
rejected the argument that considerations relating to economic efficiency should prevent the 
demolition of an unlawful construction in common property, built by one of the apartment owners 
in the building.  Id.  See also the judgment in the Adress case: Further Hearing [F.H. 20/82], 
Adress Building Materials Ltd. v. Harlow and Jones GmbH, 42(1) P.D. 221, which rejected the 
incorporation of the “efficient breach” theory into Israeli contract law.  For this theory in 
American law, see D. Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy 18 LEGAL STUD. 1 (1989).  In 
C.A. 44/76, Motion 101/76, Atta Ltd. v. Schwartz, 30(3) P.D. 785, the court dealt with a classic 
confrontation between moral and economic considerations, namely, the application of “liability 
rules” as opposed to “property rules” in the law of nuisance.  In the latter case, the plaintiff 
suffered from loud noises caused by activities of one of the biggest plants then operating in Israel, 
which employed a large number of workers.  Following comprehensive hearings, the court issued 
an injunction against the plant’s activities, and refused to content itself with the award of damages 
in favor of the plaintiff.  Id. 
  In recent years, more significant references to considerations of economic efficiency in 
Israeli case law are observed.  In C.A. 2454/98, Lindor v. Ringel, 56(1) P.D. 225, certain 
comments voiced by Justice Rivlin revealed some dissatisfaction with the overly modest weight 
accorded to considerations of economic efficiency in the Israeli legal system.  See also C.A. 
3668/98, Best Buy Mktg. Chain Ltd. v. Fidias Holdings Ltd., 53(3) P.D. 180, 191.  In Best Buy, it 
was stated that considerations of economic efficiency indeed have a place in Israeli law, even 
though the central function of the Israeli legal system is to promote “corrective justice.”  Id.  In 
the important judgment delivered in Further Civil Hearing [F.C.H.] 4465/98, Tivol (1993) Ltd. v. 
Sea Chef (1994) Ltd., 56(1) P.D. 56, the court considered whether the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Law, 5748-1988 S.H. 1258, invalidates an obligation undertaken by a partner in a partnership 
agreement not to compete following termination of the partnership.  As might be expected, the 
court indeed emphasized the heavy weight to be accorded to considerations of morality and 
fairness in law.  At the same time, in terms of the confrontation between the moral consideration 
requiring a contracting party to fulfill his obligations and the public economic interest in freedom 
of competition, the majority judges granted priority to the public interest in free competition and 
annulled the non-competition clause.  Id.  Yet, the majority judges endeavored to minimize the 
tension between moral and economic considerations by pointing out that preventing harm to 
competitiveness is itself a moral imperative.  Id.  According to this opinion, the contest is 
between opposing moral values, and not between efficiency and morality. 
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unfair competition would have supplied a satisfactory solution.  Yet, it is 
impossible to predict the entire range of unfair competition practices.  
Accordingly, moral considerations, which prevail in Israeli law over 
considerations of economic efficiency, require the establishment of a general 
prohibition on unfair competition, which can be adjusted by the judiciary in a 
flexible manner to new competitive tactics.  While applying its discretion in 
each case, the court should balance, under the given circumstances, the moral 
aspect in relation to the public interest in promoting competition. 
One contention raised during the debating stage of the bill in the Knesset 
was that the imposition of a general prohibition on unfair competition would 
be used primarily by powerful business entities against weaker bodies, in such 
a way as to deter new competitors from entering the market.  This author 
rejects such an argument completely.  Apart from the fact that it is not based 
on any empirical research (which obviously is difficult to conduct in view of 
the hypothetical nature of the argument), it also cannot be supported logically.  
A central factor in determining the unfairness of given conduct is found in the 
unfair exploitation of a position of power, whether on the level of the capacity 
to coerce or on the informational level.  The restrictive trade practice laws, for 
example, seek to prevent the creation of excessively strong centers of power on 
the assumption that they may undermine competitiveness.52  It is the strong 
entities and not the new weaker bodies that might be exposed to claims of 
unfair competition, should such a tort be recognized, in view of the fact that 
they are in positions of power that enable them, in practice, to take effective 
unfair measures. Therefore, establishing a prohibition against unfair 
competition may actually encourage competitiveness, restraining the 
exploitation of this power, and not the contrary. 
The silence of the Israeli legislature in the Commercial Torts Law 
regarding the establishment of a general tort of unfair competition should not 
be interpreted as implying a positive denial of such a tort.  True, the bill 
contained a provision establishing a general prohibition on unfair competition, 
and this provision was omitted from the final draft of the law.  However, as the 
history of the statute shows, this omission should not be understood as 
negating the potential application of the tort of negligence to this issue, but 
rather as reflecting the intention to avoid reaching a definitive decision on this 
matter within the framework of this particular piece of legislation.53  All that 
should be understood from the previously mentioned omission is that the 
 
 52. See Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988 S.H. 1258 at ch.3 (such as by means of 
restrictions on the improper exploitation of a monopoly or the amalgamation of companies). 
 53. For more information, see the presentation of the bill in the Knesset by the chairman of 
the sub-committee of the Knesset that dealt with the law.  D.K. (1999) 102. 
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legislature chose to leave untouched the legal position prevailing before the 
enactment of the law.54 
III.  THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISRAELI MISAPPROPRIATION 
DOCTRINE IN THE ASHIR RULING 
A. The Interests Involved 
The issue that the Israeli Supreme Court faced in ASHIR55 concerned a 
particular instance of unfair competition.  A developer of a new intellectual 
product56 did not proceed through established channels of intellectual property 
law and did not take steps to protect (or could not protect) the product by 
means of one of the institutional intellectual property safeguards, such as 
registration of a design.  A competitor copied the product.  Should the 
developer of the intellectual product nonetheless have been protected?  This 
was and remains the question underlying the misappropriation doctrine. 
The boundaries of the dilemma are clear.  On one hand, the law is faced 
with the interest of the product developer who has invested resources and 
money to protect the fruit of his labor, while the “free rider” competitor seeks 
to enjoy the benefit of that investment for no consideration.  The developer 
thus seeks protection within the framework of one of the basic concepts 
underlying the protection of property, namely, “the theory of labor.”57  The 
immediate inclination is to protect the developer of the product against such 
parasitical misappropriation.  Justice Cheshin, in ASHIR, termed this natural 
sense of justice as the “psychological difficulty” in allowing a 
misappropriation to take place.58  It is described in American law as the 
“restitutionary impulse.”59 
Concurrently, there is justification for granting protection to the owner of 
the intellectual product in light of the public interest to encourage the 
development of new intellectual products.  The United States Constitution 
states that protection of the public interest in social and scientific advances lies 
at the basis of the protection afforded to intellectual property as a whole.60  
Countering this sense of justice, on the other hand, are the important values 
previously mentioned,61 namely freedom of occupation, which is likely to be 
 
 54. See DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 121-122. 
 55. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289. 
 56. For details of the products discussed, see infra Part VIII. 
 57. See Andrew, supra note 2; BECKER, supra note 2; Fisher, supra note 2; Wiesner & Cava, 
supra note 2. 
 58. ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. at 411. 
 59. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992). 
 60. See U.S.  CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 20. 
 61. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
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impaired by the protection given to the owner of the product, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of competition.  Misappropriating the intellectual 
products of another may lower the price of the products and diversify the 
market.  When the imitation does not lead to consumers being misled as to the 
origin of the product, then from the internal point of view of freedom of 
competition, the market for the replica becomes a desirable secondary market 
that provides the consumer with a range of options.  If the consumer prefers to 
purchase the original product, he will pay the higher price; if the consumer is 
satisfied with an imitation, he will be able to buy it at a cheaper rate. 
Yet, the consideration relating to the encouragement of freedom of 
competition should be examined from the proper perspective.  Clearly, the fact 
that misappropriation of the plaintiffs’ intellectual products leads to the 
strengthening of competition and to the reduction of prices for consumers does 
not provide sufficient justification for the misappropriation.  With a similar 
degree of persuasiveness it could be argued that a person who misappropriates 
the tangible asset of another can sell it at a lower price than the price at which 
it might be sold by the owner, who invested money in its acquisition or 
manufacture, with a resulting prima facie benefit to the public.  The 
development of the secondary market—the replicas market—comes at the 
expense of the intellectual product owner.  It is the original product that leads 
to the enrichment of the competitor who has imitated it.  In addition, the owner 
of the original product is injured as a result of the sale of the replica, as there 
are customers who would have bought the original but will now be satisfied 
with the imitation.  Freedom to compete is not equivalent to freedom to 
misappropriate.62  Freedom of competition does not justify unfair competition.  
It would be inconceivable to argue that freedom of competition per se justifies 
the misappropriation of intellectual property.  This freedom certainly retreats, 
for example, under every legal system’s straightforward policies when 
confronted by an interest protected as one of the institutionalized intellectual 
properties.  It is possible, therefore, that this freedom will also retreat when it 
competes with other types of intellectual property interests that are not 
regulated or protected by institutionalized legislation, but are nonetheless 
justified on the merits. 
A further consideration to be weighed in this context is the public interest 
in legal certainty in view of the inevitable vagueness that accompanies the 
shaping of an inclusive judicial prohibition on misappropriation.  Another 
aspect of this issue relates to the mutual respect between authorities.  Does the 
 
 62. In the words of Lord Devlin, when he responded to the argument that granting copyright 
to an author of a commercial object restricts freedom of occupation, “[t]he law does not impinge 
on freedom of trade; it protects property.  It is no more an interference with trade than is the law 
against larceny.”  Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. Hill (Football) Ltd., 1 Eng. Rep. 465, 479 (H.L. 
1964). 
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creation of a judicial “avenue of protection” improperly circumvent the 
balances prescribed by the institutionalized intellectual property legislation?  
These questions will be examined below. 
B. Unjust Enrichment Under Israeli Law: “The Preying Eagle’s Wings” 
The past decade witnessed an impressive upsurge in the development of 
the concept of unjust enrichment in Israeli law.  Apparently, the “legal 
community” has discovered the great potential offered by this area of the law, 
and litigants routinely assert a cause of action based on contentions of unjust 
enrichment.  In a sense, unjust enrichment has turned into a claim asserting an 
“equitable” right.  It is possible to ascribe this phenomenon to general 
developments in Israeli law. 
On the interpretational level, the key expression in Section 1 of the Unjust 
Enrichment Law, is “without legal cause.”  A benefit gained from another is 
not regarded as unjust enrichment unless it falls within this category.  Clearly, 
when a given law prohibits a benefit, the benefit is maintained “without legal 
cause,” on the other hand, it is plain that when a given law allows the benefit, 
the rules of unjust enrichment will not invalidate what has been granted by 
another law and therefore the benefit is permitted.  The more difficult question 
is what solution would be given in a situation where no specific law takes a 
stance regarding the propriety of the benefit, either by way of a positive or 
negative assertion.  Logically, a number of answers are possible: 
 
1.  If the law does not prohibit the benefit, the benefit is not “without 
lawful cause.” 
 
2.  If the law does not prohibit the benefit, the benefit is nonetheless 
“without lawful cause,” as a benefit accruing to one person from 
another is unjust, unless it has been affirmatively sanctioned by the law. 
 
3. The answer should be flexible and circumstantial. 
 
Israeli case law63 and literature64 have opted for the third answer.  Thus, 
the cause of action under the rules of unjust enrichment in Israeli law has 
become primarily nourished by principles of justice.65 
Yet, it seems that in the past, the use of this cause of action in Israeli case 
law was confined to situations in which no cause of action inhered from 
another source, so that without applying the laws of unjust enrichment, the 
 
 63. A.L.A. 371/89, Leibowitz v. A.Y. Eliahu Ltd., 44(2) P.D. 309; C.F. (T.A.) 63/96, Motion 
930/96, Pakcenter Ltd. v. Telkar Co. Ltd. (unpublished). 
 64. See D. FRIEDMAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT LAW 81-86 (2d ed., vol. 2 1998). 
 65. See, e.g., A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 355-56 (J. Cheshin). 
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aggrieved party would have been left without any protection at all.  An 
excellent illustration of this may be found in the Palimport case,66 in which 
one competitor obtained an advantage over another by applying for, and 
receiving, an interlocutory injunction against the commercial activities of the 
other.  This order was later rescinded, following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
claim.  Thus, the plaintiff won an unjustified benefit (the market that became 
available to him as a result of the temporary cessation of the competitor’s 
activities) in consequence of the injunction.  The defendant submitted a claim 
demanding restitution of the plaintiff’s gains as result of the interlocutory 
injunction.  The Israeli Supreme Court upheld his claim.  In such a situation it 
was not possible to identify any other cause of action that might reasonably 
protect the interests of the defendant. 
The SodaGal case is another example in which rules of unjust enrichment 
were applied in the absence of another cause of action in order to prevent 
unfair competition.67  In SodaGal, the majority judges acknowledged that 
suppliers of gas for carbonated drinks possessed a cause of action against a 
competing business that bought the plaintiffs’ used gas containers from 
customers, thereby creating an artificial shortage for the plaintiff.  In addition, 
lower courts have applied the laws of unjust enrichment to provide a cause of 
action for the misappropriation of unregistered designs or trade names, where 
no other cause of action could be asserted for this purpose.68 
Another important development in modern Israeli law, also moving in the 
direction of expanding the cause of action of unjust enrichment, may be found 
in the Adress case,69 in which the court recognized that an injured party to a 
contract is entitled to restitution of the profits accruing to the breaching party 
from the infringement.  Adress is characterized by the fact that rather than 
applying the laws of unjust enrichment as a “last resort” to provide a cause of 
action where no other cause exists, these laws are used to strengthen remedies 
proceeding from an existing cause of action.  The party injured by the breach 
of contract does not lack a cause or a remedy, as these are afforded to him by 
the law of contract.  Although, prima facie, the law of unjust enrichment is 
being applied more “aggressively” where the aim is to strengthen a remedy, 
than in situations where this law is employed to provide a new cause of action, 
 
 66. C.A. 270/73, Palimport Ltd. v. Ziva-Geigi Ltd., 29(1) P.D. 597. 
 67. C.A. 347/90, SodaGal Ltd. v. Spilman, 47(4) P.D. 459. 
 68. In relation to the protection of unregistered trade names, see C.F. (T.A.) 1769/83, The 
Boeing Co. (Delaware Corp.) v. Boeing Travel and Tourism Ltd., 1989(3) P.M. 108; C.F. (T.A.) 
147/94, Motion 976/94, Cartier v. Snowcrest, 26(4) P.M. 942; C.F. (T.A.) 2070/90, Chanel v. 
“Silhouette,” 32(1) P.M. 297.  In relation to the protection of unregistered designs, see C.F. (T.A.) 
1339/95, I.S. Decorative Wood Weaving v. Arig-Plast Ltd., 26(3) P.M. 249; C.F. (T.A.) 186/95, 
Motion 1526/95, Akerstein Ltd., v. Selah, Concrete Prods. Co., 32(4) P.M. 469; C.F. (T.A.) 
1572/93, Motion 12716/93, Anima Fashion Ltd. v. Blan, 26(4) P.M. 913. 
 69. F.H. 20/82, Adress Building Materials Ltd. v. Harlow and Jones GmbH, 42(1) P.D. 221. 
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one may argue to the contrary.  In circumstances where no other cause of 
action exists, “there is no choice” but to confer a cause of action under the 
rules of unjust enrichment if the legal system finds it necessary to protect a just 
interest.  In contrast, strengthening the remedial aspect is somewhat less 
essential.  The willingness of the law to provide an advanced remedy through 
the laws of unjust enrichment is a more far-reaching step that relies on the 
premise that the laws of unjust enrichment are not residual in nature, but part 
of a “proper” and “regular” body of law.70 
It should be noted that the expansive development of the cause of action of 
unjust enrichment in Israeli law is also consistent with other general trends.  In 
recent decades, Israeli law has been distancing itself from formalistic concepts 
and has aspired to define legal norms on the basis of value-laden factors, 
primarily justice and fairness.  Leading this approach, both in case law and in 
academic writings, is the President of the Supreme Court of Israel, Aharon 
Barak.  The Israeli Supreme Court has made fairly aggressive use of nebulous 
principles, such as the duty of good faith when performing obligations and 
realizing rights,71 the principle of purposive interpretation applying to the 
interpretation of legal norms of every type,72 the wide-spread dissemination of 
the tort of negligence,73 the principle invalidating contracts that contravene 
public policy,74 and, since the enactment in Israel of two basic laws in 1992 
providing constitutional protection to basic human rights,75 the presumption 
that legislation does not intend to violate the rights protected by these basic 
laws.76 
 
 70. In his writings, Justice Englard has expressed his dismay at the excessive application of 
unjust enrichment laws in the Israeli legal system and their infiltration into every interpretive 
ambiguity, describing these laws poetically as “the preying eagle’s wings.”  I. Englard, The 
Preying Eagle’s Wings: On The Law of Unjust Enrichment, in ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PROF. 
GUIDO TADESKY 37 (1996). 
 71. Section 39 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973 S.H. 694 applies to all the 
obligations in civil law by virtue of Section 61 of the same law.  For the application of this 
principle and its limits, see M. Deutch, Good Faith in the Use of Rights—Red Lines in the 
Application of the Principle?, 18 IUNEI MISHPAT 161 (1994). 
 72. This principle is elaborated and developed in a comprehensive work comprising six 
volumes, written by Justice Barak, entitled Interpretation in Law (1994). 
 73. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 74. The Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, S.H. 694. 
 75. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, S.H. 1391 (1992); Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation, S.H. 1387 (1992). 
 76. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289.  Israeli legal literature and case law in this area 
are extensive. The broad conceptual framework was laid out in one of the works of President 
Barak.  See generally, AHARON BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1994). 
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C. Application of Unjust Enrichment Law as a “Conduit” for the Prohibition 
of Unfair Competition 
In ASHIR, five of the seven judges favored a broad application of unjust 
enrichment law as a device for the establishment of a prohibition on the 
misappropriation of an intellectual product of another.  They sought to do this 
by exploiting the impressive “normative energy” accumulated by these rules in 
Israeli law.  The prohibition applies when an “extra element” justifies its 
application under the given circumstances.77  The sixth judge, Justice Cheshin, 
also concurred that the existence of an “extra element” might lead to the 
imposition of liability.  Although, in his view, this element had to amount at 
least to a “quasi-tort,” i.e., an improper act that was “almost” a tort.  The 
seventh judge, Justice Englard, rejected the application of the rules of unjust 
enrichment unless the misappropriation is prohibited by a law exterior to the 
law of unjust enrichment.  This approach is consistent with the criticism he 
voiced regarding what he saw as the excessive impact of the rules of unjust 
enrichment, as developed in Israeli case law.78 
D. The Ramifications of the ASHIR Ruling on a General Unfair Competition 
Tort 
The ruling in ASHIR has clear ramifications for the issue discussed 
previously concerning the development in Israel of a general tort of unfair 
competition by means of the tort of negligence.  The basic consideration 
relating to the two causes of action (the cause of unjust enrichment and the 
cause of negligence) are similar.  The conceptual frameworks are identical; the 
two causes are based upon fluid legal norms, which are given concrete 
meaning by the judiciary in a flexible case-by-case manner on the basis of a 
balance between interests, weighing social, economic and normative factors.  
Both causes of action enable the court to reach a “just” solution by means of 
this process of balances, without any substantial preconditions.  It is not 
surprising that in the spirit of the general trend of Israeli law to strengthen the 
legal devices that empower the court to develop the law, the tort of negligence 
has been awarded pride of place.79 
The “energies” enveloping the tort of negligence resemble, therefore, those 
enveloping the cause of action afforded in unjust enrichment law.  Both causes 
 
 77. It should be pointed out, for the sake of accuracy, that one of these five judges, Justice 
Zamir, preferred a slightly different formulation of the element imposing liability, and expressed 
reservations regarding the need for an “extra element.”  He stated that in situations of 
“particularly severity,” the existence of an imitation is sufficient per se to impose liability.  
Logically, however, the “particular severity” necessarily assumes a situation that entails an “extra 
element,” namely, the element of particular severity. 
 78. See Englard, supra note 70. 
 79. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
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of action enable the Israeli court to issue an injunction preventing the 
prohibited activity.80  On the remedial level, the principal difference between 
the two causes of action is that the tort of negligence confers a right to 
damages, whereas the law of unjust enrichment results in restitution of the 
profits of the defendant.  Yet, this distinction does not justify a different policy 
for each cause of action in relation to the imposition of the prohibition on 
unfair competition.  From the point of view of the infringing party, the remedy 
of damages will not necessarily be more severe than the remedy of restitution.  
On occasion, one remedy will impose a greater burden on the infringing party, 
while on other occasions, the other remedy will be more onerous.  From the 
point of view of the potential damage to competitiveness, liability to restore 
profits will not deter competition more than liability to pay damages.  It should 
also be noted that, in any event, the aggrieved party will only obtain the higher 
of the two figures.81  From a normative perspective, the basic policies 
underlying the tort of negligence and unjust enrichment law are similar. 
In ASHIR, President Barak pointed out that the basis for imposing a 
prohibition on unjust enrichment in relation to the misappropriation of 
intellectual products is the prevention of unfair competition.  Even though he 
mentioned that he did not have to decide whether the tort of negligence may be 
interpreted as establishing a general tort of unfair competition, his approach to 
this possibility was manifestly favorable.82  In contrast, Justice Englard 
explicitly rejected this possibility.83  The remaining judges did not comment on 
this issue.  In this author’s opinion, the ruling in ASHIR will inevitably lead to 
the “institutionalization” of a general tort prohibiting unfair competition in 
Israeli law, alongside the prohibition established by the law of unjust 
enrichment. 
E. Unjust Enrichment, Negligence and Legal Certainty 
The application of the law of unjust enrichment and the tort of negligence 
entail a severe element of uncertainty.  This element was emphasized in ASHIR 
by Justice Cheshin, who was in the minority in relation to a meaningful 
application of the law of unjust enrichment to cases of misappropriation.  In his 
view, legal certainty could only be ensured by adhering closely to statutory 
provisions and refraining from extensive judicial developments that might lead 
 
 80. See A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 (authorizing the court to issue an injunction 
preventing the action likely to lead to unjust enrichment). 
 81. For American case law on this point, see Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) 
and Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 407 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. 1980). See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 45 reporters note, cmt. c.; M. Hutter, The 
Case for Adoption of a Uniform Trade Secrets Act in New York, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 33 
(1999). 
 82. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 475-76. 
 83. Id. at 447. 
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to an obfuscation of the law.84  This approach raises the basic dilemma as to 
the degree to which judicial activism is desirable.  This issue is the subject of 
persisting controversy in Israel.85 
The ASHIR judgment provides an excellent case study.  ASHIR clearly 
illustrates the problems involved, as well as the proper balance, both on the 
theoretical level and on the practical level, between the interest of legal 
certainty and the interest of justice.  Legal certainty is primarily intended to 
protect economic efficiency.  It is an essential condition for the appropriate 
legal planning of transactions and modes of conduct.  The relative weight of 
this value varies in accordance with the branch of law being considered.  Thus, 
for example, there is a substantial need to protect the planning interest in the 
areas of property law and taxation,86 but a more limited need in the area of 
administrative law, which in any event is suffused with broad judicial 
discretion.  In relation to unfair competition, obscuring legal certainty carries a 
significant price, both from the vantage point of the competing individual, who 
to a large extent relies on assessments of the legitimacy of his conduct when 
planning his business activities, and from the vantage point of the public 
interest in fostering competitiveness.  Yet, this view does not negate the 
justification for conferring proper protection on intellectual products that have 
not been registered as intellectual property, but only restricts their protection. 
The Israeli system accords primacy to considerations of justice over 
considerations of efficiency, in a variety of areas, as mentioned previously.87  
The “restitutionary impulse”88 rests on a profound sense of justice, and this 
sense of justice should not be satisfied solely in exceptional cases.  Indeed, in 
the same way the restitutionary impulse does not justify the imposition of a 
prohibition on every imitation, the “competitive impulse” does not justify 
negating the protection of the owner of a product in every case.  Like other 
cases of unfair competition detailed previously,89 a balancing process based on 
the circumstances of the particular case is essential.  As will be explained 
below,90 the ruling in ASHIR provides clear indications of the criteria to be 
considered when drawing this balance that will substantially lessen the degree 
of uncertainty of the final outcome. 
It may be added in this context that the institutionalized intellectual 
property legislation is also teeming with uncertain elements.  It would be far 
from accurate to describe the intellectual property laws as an “island of 
certainty.”  Thus, for example, the basic distinction found at the core of the 
 
 84. ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. at 367. 
 85. See the compilation of articles on this issue in 17(3) IUNEI MISHPAT (1993). 
 86. A. BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 70-71 (1987). 
 87. See supra note 51. 
 88. See Gordon, supra note 59. 
 89. See supra Part II. 
 90. See infra Part VI. 
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copyright law, between protected and unprotected objects, i.e., between an idea 
and an expression of an idea, is a distinction that is not based on any analytical 
process.  Instead, it is nurtured entirely by flexible legal policies that draw a 
balance between the need to reward the author and public needs.  From a 
logical point of view, every idea is an expression of another idea that is located 
on a more abstract plane.  At which point the degree of abstractness crosses the 
boundary line between the “general” and the “concrete” is necessarily a 
question of evaluation that relies on particularly flexible aspects of legal 
policy.91  In other areas of intellectual property too, the situation is not much 
better with regard to legal certainty.  Concepts such as “novelty” and “non-
obviousness” in patent law,92 “distinctive mark” in trademark law,93 and the 
like, are inevitably vague.  This is also true in relation to the concept of 
infringement of intellectual property rights.  Infringement of an intellectual 
property right generally requires, inter alia, the existence of “substantial 
similarity” between the protected object and the object used by the defendant.  
Substantial similarity does not require complete replication; it is satisfied with 
an appropriation of the essence of the intellectual property.  The concept of 
“substantial similarity” is swathed by a “mountain of case law;” the tests 
employed by the courts being of a largely intuitive character.94  An additional 
example in this context is the nebulous defense of fair use.95 
It is possible to draw two contrary conclusions from the previous remarks.  
One possible conclusion is that in view of the serious risks that this uncertainty 
poses to a person competing with the owner of an intellectual product, the law 
should aspire to reduce such risks in so far as possible.  However, the opposite 
 
 91. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO. L. REV. 121, 140-
141 (1999).  See also GARNETT ET AL., supra note 39, at 429-431; 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.3 (1989) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT]; 1 H. LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 223-227 
(2d ed. 1995). 
 92. This matter is regulated in Israel by Sections 3 and 5 of the Patents Law, 5727-1967, 
S.H. 510.  For the American law on this issue, see 35 U.S.C §§ 101-103 (2000) and 2 
LIPSCOMB’S WALKER ON PATENTS 84-85 (3d ed. by Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III 1985). 
 93. For the Israeli law, see Section 8 of the Trade Marks Ordinance [New Version], D.M.I. 
26 (1972).  For the American law on this matter, see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 94. See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int’l v. Software Artisans Inc., 3 F.3d 730 (1993); 
Kregos v. The Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656 (1993); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: 
PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.2.1.2 (1989); Linda Benjamin, Tuning up the Copyright Act: 
Substantial Similarity and Sound Recording Protections, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Jeffrey 
D. Coulter, Computers, Copyright and Substantial Similarity: The Test Reconsidered, 14 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 47 (1995). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 91, at §10.1-.3; 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985).  In Israeli law, this 
defense is confined to certain purposes including private study, research, critique, review, or 
journalistic summary.  See Copyright Act, § 2(1)(I). 
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conclusion carries at least the same persuasive weight.  As noted, legal 
certainty is not the sole consideration that shapes the law; it is merely one 
factor that must be balanced against competing values.  The desire to promote 
fairness is a fundamental legal aspiration.  If the party competing with the 
owner of an intellectual product is now operating in a legal atmosphere 
pervaded by risks, even when the situation is regulated by the institutionalized 
intellectual property law, an approach that does not restrict the application of 
the law of unjust enrichment solely to exceptional cases will not substantively 
modify this atmosphere. 
Preservation of the existing situation—which too is uncertain—does not 
justify harm to the principle of fairness.  As a rule, the fact that a given 
situation (i.e., the prevailing uncertainty) is undesirable, does not justify 
deepening that undesirable situation.  However, if one seeks to impair an 
opposing, powerful value (the principle of fairness) in order to preserve 
stability, it is legitimate to weigh whether stability exists at all.  Indeed, 
substantial disadvantages are involved in the conferral of protection on 
intellectual products by way of flexible judicial law making.  The court cannot 
set an arbitrary period of validity for a right, it cannot develop new 
administrative institutions or new public registers that will ensure a sharper 
balance between interests, and it cannot create an entire institution through 
judicial rulings in the same way as the legislature may proceed by way of 
statute.  However, the appropriate answer to this problem is not to sanction 
improper behavior, but rather to adopt a responsible and cautious approach to 
the development of the requisite protection. 
Ultimately, the previously mentioned factors that justify the establishment 
of a general prohibition against unfair competition96 also justify the recognition 
that substantial application of the laws of unjust enrichment and the tort of 
negligence are necessary to prevent the misappropriation of intellectual 
products.  As the majority in ASHIR concluded, such application should not be 
confined solely to exceptional cases. 
IV.  “THE ‘DUAL PATH’ DOCTRINE” ISSUING FROM THE ASHIR CASE 
The doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in ASHIR concerning the 
protection of intellectual products may be termed the “dual path doctrine.”  
One path is that provided by the institutionalized intellectual property law, 
which applies when intellectual property is registered, or when the relevant 
factual elements exist that give rise to it (as in the case of copyright).97  The 
second path is the “bypass” path, created by virtue of the law of unjust 
 
 96. See infra Part II. 
 97. In American law, depositing the work is not essential to the establishment of copyright.  
The failure to deposit may reduce the statutory damages, when the infringer did not know and 
could not have known that he was infringing others’ rights.  See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000). 
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enrichment (and in the view of this author, also by virtue of the tort of 
negligence).  This is the path that may be followed when no protection is 
afforded by the institutionalized path, and that perhaps also supplements the 
institutionalized route even when, in principle, the latter does afford 
protection.98  The judges in ASHIR were unanimous in denying that any 
across-the-board negative arrangement exists in the intellectual property 
legislation, which wholly negates the evolvement of a bypass path based upon 
the law of unjust enrichment.  Yet, the judges were divided regarding the scope 
of the negative arrangement that does exist in the intellectual property 
legislation, as it inevitably does in much other legislation.  In the view of two 
of the judges in ASHIR,99 this scope is broad and generally precludes the 
possibility of developing protective measures for an owner of an intellectual 
product within the framework of the bypass path.  In contrast, the five other 
judges were willing to grant fairly liberal “maneuvering room” for the 
development of this route, alongside the institutionalized path. 
The ASHIR ruling therefore creates two levels of protection for intellectual 
products—with each route possessing its own characteristics. The 
institutionalized route confers upon the owner powerful protection that on 
occasion is monopolistic in character (such as a patent),100 or at least in rem 
(copyright) 101 or quasi in rem (trade secret).102  In the Israeli legal system, it 
also occasionally enables harsher remedies to be obtained, such as punitive 
damages,103 as well as important procedural advantages, such as invasive 
Anton Piller orders.104  The bypass route, drawing from the law of unjust 
enrichment or from the tort of negligence, is a more “refined” and moderate 
course, which relies on flexible balances drawn on a case-by-case basis, and 
that is guided by certain standards that shall be elaborated upon below.  The 
developer will be protected only when an “extra element” exists, besides the 
very imitation itself.  This route does not afford the plaintiff stable, 
comprehensive and certain protection.  Selecting this option, from the point of 
 
 98. This, obviously, is subject to the possibility that a negative arrangement is to be implied 
under the circumstances, from the institutionalized path.  For a discussion of this issue, see 
DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 269-271. 
 99. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 (Cheshin & Englard JJ.). 
 100. The significance is that a person is prohibited from using the invention, even if he 
arrived at it independently.  For the monopolistic character of a patent, see PETER D. 
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.03 (2d. ed. 1986).  See also Steven J. Davidson, 
Reverse Engineering and the Development of Compatible and Competitive Products under U.S. 
Law, 5 COMPUTER. SCI. HIGH TECH. L.J. 329, 409 (1989). 
 101. The in rem nature of copyright is expressly established by statute in England.  See 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
 102. See DEUTCH, supra note 28. 
 103. See Commercial Torts Law, 5759-1999 S.H. 1709 § 13; Copyright Ordinance, 1924, § 
3a. P.L. vol. 1, 389 [em.] (Isr.). 
 104. See supra notes 38-39. 
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view of the plaintiff, carries a “price” that is far from trivial.  The motivation to 
institutionalize intellectual property, thereby conferring a new advantage upon 
society as a whole via the contract between the developer and the public,105 
thus continues to prevail, notwithstanding the possibility of gaining protection 
by means of unjust enrichment law.  Frequently, the developer will prefer the 
route that is more certain and powerful from his point of view—the 
institutionalized channel—in return for paying a premium to society.  Thus, the 
bypass path does not undermine the vividness and relevance of the 
institutionalized path.106 
V.  THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICAN LAW TOWARDS THE DUAL PATH DOCTRINE 
ASHIR dealt with a well-known issue in American jurisprudence.  
American case law has deliberated long and hard about the justification for 
circumventing intellectual property legislation by means of the flexible 
mechanism of the tort of unfair competition.  In 1918, the Supreme Court 
established the legal theory known as the “misappropriation doctrine” in the 
controversial case of International News Service v. Associated Press,107 which 
dealt with the protection of the right of a press agency to be the first to publish 
information it gathered throughout the United States.  Over the course of time, 
this doctrine underwent a variety of revisions.  The unmistakable legal trend in 
American law, in the aftermath of the judgment in International News Service, 
has been to erode the legal policy that led to that judgment.  At first, case law 
has held that it is necessary to show that the misappropriation was “regular, 
systematic and deliberate.”108  Later case law109 sharply limited the application 
 
 105. Intellectual property rights are customarily justified by the existence of a conceptual 
contract between the developer and the public.  Thus, in the case of the registration of a patent, 
the inventor obtains monopolistic protection for a certain period of time, while in return he 
discloses the details of the invention, so that at the expiration of the protection period, the 
invention will become part of the public domain.  See, e.g., 1 ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at § 
1.02. 
 106. According to the abovementioned, this article will use the terminology bypass path or 
bypass route to describe the cause of action based upon the law of unjust enrichment or the tort of 
negligence, protecting intellectual products against misappropriation.  The institutionalized path 
describes the cause of action according to the traditional legislation of intellectual property. 
 107. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 108. Metro Associated Servs. Inc. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 224, 236 
(1953). 
 109. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 56 
(1972); CBS Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 318 (1967); Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab. Inc., 187 
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1982). 
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of the misappropriation doctrine in such a way as to lead some to conclude that 
the doctrine had been abandoned altogether.110 
In 1997, case law111 clarified the issue by holding that protection of 
published information is limited to “hot news” items, and depends on the 
existence of a number of factors: the plaintiff’s investment in gathering or 
creating the information, highly sensitive information in terms of the time of its 
publication, defendant seeking to take a “ride” on the back of the plaintiff’s 
investments, the defendant’s use of the information in direct competition with 
the plaintiff, and the idea that authorizing the activities of the defendant would 
undermine the incentive of the plaintiff to invest resources to a degree that 
would endanger the creation of that product by the plaintiff, or the quality of 
the product.112  The court in National Basketball Association v. NBA 
Properties, Inc. noted that, “INS [International News Service] is not about 
ethics; it is about the protection of property rights in time-sensitive information 
so that the information will be made available to the public by profit seeking 
entrepreneurs.”113 
A perusal of the Restatement reveals the problems underlying the 
development of American law on this issue.  Section 38 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition describes the prevailing American law to the 
effect that the appropriation of intangible trade values is prohibited only in the 
following three cases: 
 
1. When a competitor misappropriates the plaintiff’s trade secret. 
 
2.  When a competitor infringes the “right of publicity,” i.e., he 
misappropriates the economic benefit emanating from the identity of 
another person, by making use of that identity for business purposes, 
without the other person’s consent.  This protection is confined to 
aggrieved parties who are physical persons, as opposed to artificial 
entities.114  It deals, primarily, with the protection of famous 
personalities against the misuse of their names for the purpose of 
making a profit. 
 
 110. See Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury It or 
Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 805-06 (1994). 
 111. See Nat’l Basketball Assoc. & NBA Props., Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (1997). 
 112. For the approach regarding the protection of “hot news” as a special law, see Rex J. 
Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the Commercial Value of 
‘Hot News’ Information, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 421 (1998).  For the issue of “hot news,” see Jason 
R. Boyarski, The Heist of Feist: Protection for Collections of Information and the Possible 
Federalization of ‘Hot News’, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999). 
 113. National Basketball Assoc., 105 F.3d at 853. 
 114. For this right, see Dale P. Olson, Common Law Misappropriation in the Digital Era, 64 
MO. L. REV. 837, 858-861 (1999). 
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3. When the cause of action arises under federal or state legislation, under 
an international convention, or where the act comprises a breach of 
contract or a breach of the common law copyright.  The common law 
copyright confers protection on the right to be the first to publish a 
protected work.115 
 
These categories do not relate to the cases concerning the misappropriation 
doctrine.  Yet, the general prohibition on unfair competition, as formulated in 
Section 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,116 may provide a 
sufficient ground for the misappropriation doctrine, if it is justified on the 
merits. 
With regard to the relationship between the institutionalized protection of 
intellectual products and the general principle prohibiting unfair competition, 
the Commissioner of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has 
stated—in relation to situations in which the institutionalized path has rejected 
the grant of protection in a given situation—that, “if the restriction expresses 
an important policy of the law against the imposition of liability in such 
circumstances, the conduct should not be actionable as unfair competition.”117 
Attempts in American law to implement the misappropriation doctrine in 
situations such as those recently discussed in Israel in ASHIR concerning 
intellectual products, have generally not succeeded.  Thus, for example, the 
attempt to protect the design of products against imitation by means of this 
doctrine have generally failed,118 as have attempts involving the imitation of 
commercial names,119 although the doctrine has been implemented from time 
to time in connection with certain objects.120  Today, as noted, this doctrine is 
usually perceived as limited primarily, albeit not conclusively, to the special 
situation considered in International News Service, namely, the attempt to 
protect exclusivity in the immediate publication of “hot news.” 121 
One may also find in the legal literature views advocating the more 
substantial implementation of this doctrine.  Thus, American legal literature 
has proposed developing the misappropriation doctrine in a direction that will 
 
 115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 38 (1995). 
 116. See supra Part II-A. 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. g (1995) (emphasis 
added).  The possible existence of a negative arrangement in the institutionalized path concerning 
the grant of protection under the bypass route was also a central aspect in ASHIR, as detailed 
supra in Part IV. 
 118. See W. Edward Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 
VAND. L. REV. 483, 496-499 (1958). 
 119. See Speedry Prods., Inc. v. Dri-Mark Prods., Inc., 271 F.2d 646 (1959). 
 120. Affiliated Enter. Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958 (1936). 
 121. Nat’l Basketball Assoc. & NBA Properties, Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (1997). 
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distinguish between imitation of the intellectual product itself and 
misappropriation of associated rights.122  According to this view, it would be 
proper to allow the free imitation of an intellectual product, when the 
institutionalized intellectual property laws afford no protection.  However, 
possibly the misappropriation of associated rights would not be considered fair.  
For example, in International News Service, the appropriation of the news 
items per se was not regarded as an unfair act, but misappropriation of the right 
to be the first to publish the material had to be prohibited.123  The right of first 
exploitation of the intellectual product is an essential interest of the owner that 
cannot be freely removed from him.  Sease regards this approach as one which, 
in view of its flexibility, draws a proper balance between the respective 
interests of the parties.124  To a large extent, this view fits the fundamental 
concept underlying the ASHIR ruling—appropriation of the intellectual product 
is not sufficient per se to impose liability according to this ruling.  This would 
contravene the policy pursued by the institutionalized path that shapes the 
boundaries of the protection afforded to a particular intellectual product.  
However, the existence of an extra element may lead to the imposition of 
liability according to the bypass path.  Such an extra element might take the 
form of the misappropriation of associated rights.  Thus, the need to protect the 
resources invested by the owner of the intellectual product, i.e., protection of 
his exclusivity during the initial period following the development of the 
product, is one of the factors weighed within the context of the extra element 
under ASHIR. 
In a comprehensive theoretical analysis,125 Professor Gordon has argued 
that a substantial percentage of those appropriating the intellectual products of 
others should not necessarily be regarded as parasites.  Frequently, in 
consequence of the appropriation, they develop their own innovative products 
that benefit the public, and are not merely content to copy the product of the 
plaintiff.  In addition, affording protection by means of the misappropriation 
doctrine ignores the balances featured in intellectual property laws that include 
restrictions on the period of protection.  Professor Gordon has warned against 
an unlimited surrender to the “restitutionary impulse,”126 i.e., to giving 
excessive weight to the perception that “he who sews shall reap” and expresses 
her fear that too little weight will be given to opposing economic and social 
 
 122. Sease, supra note 110. 
 123. Int’l. News Serv., 248 U.S. 215, 253 n.4 (1918). 
 124. Id. at 807. 
 125. Gordon, supra note 59. 
 126. As stated above, it is interesting to note that Justice Cheshin, who objected in ASHIR to 
substantial application of the bypass path, also used an expression borrowed from the world of 
first reactions when he described the natural desire to protect the owner of an intellectual product 
as a “psychological difficulty.”  Both expressions therefore warn the judicial policy makers to be 
vigilant not to make instinctive, irrational decisions, based on the “pure” sense of justice. 
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interests.  At the same time, Professor Gordon does not propose abolishing the 
misappropriation doctrine, but rather advocates moderating it by means of an 
array of detailed restrictions and balances.127  She suggests that the following 
elements be required for the imposition of liability in respect of the use of an 
institutionalized intellectual product of another: 
 
1. The existence of an “eligible intangible,” i.e., an intellectual product 
that was created for profit, the owner having indicated his ownership of 
the product in one of a variety of ways; 
 
2. The said product has been knowingly copied; 
 
3. The copy has been made in circumstances which, in the absence of 
legal protection, would lead to an asymmetric market failure, i.e., the 
defendant would be capable of making copies whereas the plaintiff 
would not possess reasonable physical methods of preventing the 
defendant from making those copies; 
 
4. The copy deprives the plaintiff of a market segment; and 
 
5. A non-reciprocal situation exists, i.e., a situation in which the plaintiff 
will not enjoy equivalent freedom of action over the long term.  In this 
context, the concept of reciprocity is directed to the case of copying in 
small quantities. The plaintiff has an interest in ensuring that the law 
will not preclude copies of this type, as he too may wish to engage in 
the same activity in other cases.128 
 
Even though the Israeli Supreme Court in ASHIR did not examine the legal 
literature dealing with American law, there is a certain resemblance between 
the criteria described in that literature and the fundamental balancing formula 
established in ASHIR. 
VI.  THE “EXTRA ELEMENT” ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELI MISAPPROPRIATION 
DOCTRINE 
In ASHIR, the Israeli Supreme Court set out an organized list of factors 
that must be balanced in order to determine the legitimacy of an imitation 
under the bypass path of the Israeli misappropriation doctrine.  These criteria 
offer important guidelines as to the manner in which disputes should be 
 
 127. She even suggests changing the name of the tort to one that possesses a connotation less 
negative than misappropriation, namely, “malcompetitive copying.”  See Gordon, supra note 59, 
at 222. 
 128. See Gordon, supra note 59, at 222-24. 
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resolved in this connection, thereby substantially reducing the harm to legal 
certainty and to competition ensuing from the amorphous misappropriation 
doctrine. 
A. Considerations Concerning the Nature of the Protected Interest 
Among the factors found in this paradigm, the Supreme Court in ASHIR 
enumerated the following additional factors: 
 
a. The extent of the investment of labor and resources devoted by the 
owner of the intellectual product to developing that product; 
 
b. The degree of innovation of the particular intellectual product and its 
contribution to society, and 
 
c. The degree to which the product may actually be implemented. 
 
The intensity of the protected interest is derived from both private and 
public considerations.  The extent of the investment devoted by the owner of 
the product to developing the product is the factor that founds this private 
interest and justifies its protection within the framework of the labor theory.  
The degree of innovation of the product is a factor possessing importance in 
relation to the private interest because it has an impact on the value of the 
product, but its primary importance lies in the public interest.  As an innovative 
product makes a contribution to society and the economy, the legal system 
must provide an incentive for such developments by conferring appropriate 
protection upon the developer of the product. 
Thus, Justice Strasberg-Cohen stated in ASHIR, “the copied idea must be 
certain, definable, innovative, unique and capable of being implemented, and it 
must be an idea the owner of which used or intends to use.”129  The question of 
the use of a product affects both the private and public interest.  If the owner of 
the product uses or intends to use the product, the harm to his economic 
interest will be significant, and this may justify granting protection by means 
of the bypass route, from the point of view of his private interest.  However, 
the existence of use or an intention to use the product in the future also 
indicates that the product has practical applications, evidencing that it offers a 
contribution to society.  The public interest will therefore aspire to encourage 
the owner of the product to engage in developments in these circumstances. 
Justice Barak stated in ASHIR, “the more important the work, the more 
innovative, the more unique and the more significant its contribution, the 
greater will be the tendency to regard an imitation or a copy of it as unfair 
 
 129. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 432. 
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competition.”130  In addition, Barak noted, “copying or imitating a work in 
which a great deal of labor or research were invested is not the same as 
copying or imitating a simple work, in which no great effort was invested in its 
development.”131 
It seems (and the manner of implementing the criteria set out in ASHIR to 
the concrete products discussed in that case testifies to this)132 the question of 
the uniqueness and novelty of the product is a central element in drawing the 
balance.  As noted, conferring protection within the framework of the bypass 
path entails a significant price from the perspective of the public interest, in 
view of the harm to competitiveness.  It would be right to balance this damage 
not only by countering it with considerations concerning private interests, but 
also with considerations taken from the public arena.  The uniqueness and 
novelty of a product create an important public interest in protecting its 
development. 
B. Considerations Concerning the Process of Imitation and the Conduct of 
the Imitator 
Within the framework of this paradigm, the ASHIR ruling includes the 
following factors: 
 
a. The degree to which the imitator’s conduct entails a wrongful mental 
component.133 
 
b. The degree to which the process of imitation is systematic, i.e., whether 
the imitation is one-time or methodical.134 
 
c. The scope of the imitation, i.e., whether the copy of the product is full 
or only partial.135 
 
d. Date of the imitation.136 
 
 130. Id. at 479. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See infra Part VIII. 
 133. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 at 434, 495, 502.  The more malicious the 
activity in terms of injuring the plaintiff the more likely the imposition of liability.  Id. 
 134. Id.  The harm caused by systematic imitation is higher and should be blocked more 
forcefully. 
 135. Id.  The more the copy entails a “slavish imitation,” the greater the need to prohibit it.  
This element is also of importance in terms of the public interest.  A partial copy, which 
embodies an independent contribution on the part of the imitator, is less wrongful, as the input of 
the imitator contributes to the public interest in developing novel intellectual products.  Id.  See 
also Gordon, supra note 59. 
 136. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 at 434, 495, 502.  The length of time during 
which the plaintiff’s product has been in the market is of great importance for the purpose of 
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e. The degree of difficulty in the process of imitation.137 
C. The Justification for not Registering Institutionalized Intellectual Property 
The reason why an owner of a product does not register institutionalized 
intellectual property when he could have done so, was regarded as significant 
by most of the judges in ASHIR.  The judgment disclosed a wide consensus 
that non-registration because of the short-term, fashionable character of a 
product would not impair the protection available to the developer of the 
product according to the bypass path.  However, the judges expressed a 
varying range of views in relation to the ramifications of failing to register in 
other circumstances.  The majority of the judges expected that the product 
developer would explain the reasons for refraining from registration, although 
they differed as to the impact of an unconvincing explanation.138 
Although according to the majority opinion in ASHIR, there must be 
reasonable and relevant reasons for an owner of a product to refrain from 
following the institutionalized route, the importance of this element should not 
be overstated.139  First, President Barak, who has played a dominant role in 
shaping judicial policy in Israel on a wide variety of issues, has refrained from 
adopting this criterion.  Second, in this author’s opinion, the owner of an 
intellectual product is entitled, in principle, to choose the bypass route as a 
tactical course of action.  The conferral of protection within this context is not 
based solely on a perception that there is no other choice.  As noted, the 
protection afforded by unjust enrichment law is largely based on the principle 
of fairness, which is impaired when an intellectual product is misappropriated.  
In view of the price attached to this form of protection from the point of view 
of the public interest, it is possible to add an incentive that should be supplied 
to the developer for choosing the institutionalized route to the basket of factors 
shaping the extra element.  Yet, this is not a factor that is sufficient by itself to 
decide the issue one way or another. 
To some extent, it is possible to prove this contention if one takes the 
protection of trade secrets as an example.  On the assumption that a given legal 
system does not protect trade secrets by means of an institutionalized statutory 
 
examining whether the period during which the plaintiff enjoyed exclusivity—prior to the 
imitation—provided him with a return on his investment.  Id.  This factor will be further 
explained below in the context of the public interest, although, obviously, it also reflects a private 
interest of the developer. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 239-247. 
 139. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 at 434, 489, 501-02. 
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path,140 there would certainly still be justification for protecting this interest by 
means of the bypass route of unjust enrichment or the tort of negligence, 
relying on a flexible system of balances.  The protection of trade secrets 
developed in the Israeli legal system as it did in other legal systems, 
specifically without statutory regulation and on the basis of the same concepts 
and considerations as those underlying the misappropriation doctrine.141  Even 
if the owner of a trade secret is entitled to register it as a patent, he is entitled to 
prefer a less powerful mode of protection that does not provide him with a 
monopoly, if he believes that he will be able to keep the information secret for 
a substantial period that exceeds the term of a possible patent.  It would be 
unjust to expose the owner of the secret to unrestricted misappropriation, 
although in certain circumstances, depending on the array of factors described 
above, such appropriation will be legitimate.  This protection does not uproot 
patent law.  It just creates an additional, balanced and necessary degree of 
protection for intellectual interests. 
The owner of the secret in such a case is not prepared to enter into a 
complete contract with society.  Such a contract would entail following the 
institutionalized route and winning a monopoly or property rights in return for 
making a greater contribution to society by disclosing the invention through 
the patent registration process.  However, fairness and the other factors 
described previously require society to agree to a limited contract, in which the 
developer of the product offers less to society and receives less in return, 
namely, he does not attract powerful protection in the shape of a monopoly or 
property rights, but nonetheless obtains limited and balanced protection.  It 
should be noted that society has an interest in encouraging the development of 
new products, as such development diversifies the market and promotes 
competition.  This is so even if the information is not exposed to the public by 
the way of a patent registration. 
D. Considerations Within the Public Interest 
Considerations that touch upon the public interest naturally possess 
substantial weight in the balancing process.  In addition to the factors described 
above, a central consideration referred to by Chief Justice Barak in ASHIR 
concerns the possibility of a market failure in the event that protection is not 
conferred to the owner of the product.  The situations referred to by Chief 
Justice Barak include those in which the product is not in the market for a 
sufficient time to compensate the owner for the cost of researching and 
 
 140. This was the situation in Israel before the enactment of the Commercial Torts Law in 
1999.  The protection accorded to trade secrets was elaborated upon by the case law.  See id. at 
ch. 4. 
 141. For an analysis of the purposes of protecting trade secrets, see DEUTCH, supra note 28, at 
321-325. 
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developing the product.142  As noted, this is a consideration that also falls 
within the private interest category of the product owner.  Other situations 
mentioned by Justice Barak include cases where a competitor sells the product 
at a lower price than that required by the owner of the product.  The lower 
price is made possible because the competitor has saved development costs as 
well as the costs of penetrating the market.143  Another paradigm includes 
cases in which the owner of the product has developed an item consisting of a 
number of components where the manufacturer anticipates receiving a return 
on his investment on one component out of the sale of the other.  Copying a 
single component that is expected to lead to an overall profit will be deemed to 
be unfair.144 
The time needed to return the investments in developing the product is also 
relevant to determining the duration of the protection according to the bypass 
path.  Determining the duration of the protection to be given by the court to an 
intellectual product is a difficult element in the process of shaping the 
boundaries of the misappropriation doctrine.  The case law is limited by 
institutional restrictions.  It cannot set a fixed arbitrary time period and it 
cannot regulate this matter in a comprehensive manner in view of the fact that 
the court is dependent on suitable cases coming before it for adjudication.  This 
judicial difficulty in fixing time periods for protection was emphasized by 
Justice Cheshin in ASHIR.145  The solution to this problem may be found in the 
establishment of a functional criterion.  Thus, Chief Justice Barak proposed in 
ASHIR the following test—the protection should apply for the period of time 
required to reimburse the owner of the product for his investments (possibly, in 
addition to a reasonable profit).146  This would prevent the market failure that 
would otherwise occur and consequently make entrepreneurs reluctant to 
invest in the development of new intellectual products. 
This delimitation of the period of protection is highly significant in terms 
of legal certainty and the need to preserve competitiveness.  The extra caution 
that will inevitably be exercised by the imitator will be limited primarily to the 
first few years of the life of the product in the market, and in the case of a 
product of only short term relevance, perhaps to its first few months in the 
market.  It will frequently be possible to assess when the sales of a product will 
provide a sufficient return on the owner’s investments, thereby assisting a 
potential product imitator to evaluate his legal position. 
 
 142. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D.289 at 479-80. 
 143. Id. at 480, 488. 
 144. Id. at 480. 
 145. Id. at 354. 
 146. This point was not sufficiently clarified in the ASHIR ruling.  See DEUTCH, supra note 
28, at 238-239. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
536 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:503 
Another consideration falling within the public interest mentioned in 
ASHIR, is whether or not the competitor possesses an alternative to copying the 
product should he seek to achieve the functional purpose of the product.147  
The harm to competitiveness will be more extensive if no alternative options 
are available.  In such a case, blocking the imitation will entail a complete 
obstruction of any competition to the particular product under consideration. 
VII.  PROTECTION OF PUBLISHED INFORMATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
THE BYPASS PATH 
It may be possible to classify the objects that merit protection in 
intellectual property law into two categories.  The first category consists of 
objects that may be termed information.  This includes the right to a patent, 
which protects the information relating to an invention, and the right to a trade 
secret, which protects a wide range of information in relation to processes, 
business methods, client lists and the like.148  The second category consists of 
certain forms of expression.  Thus, copyright protects the special method of 
expressing an idea, a design protects a certain shape that “makes the article 
attractive or distinctive in appearance,”149 and a trademark protects the 
appellation of a business or product.  Even though a trade secret may also be a 
certain form of expression of information, its major advantage lies in the fact 
that it confers protection upon the interest in the information itself.  Whereas 
the other forms of intellectual property mentioned previously enable the 
appropriation of the idea contained in the information, if it is given a different 
“garb” by means of another expression, the law of trade secrets also prohibits 
the appropriation of the information itself. 
There is a substantial difference between the levels of protection 
appropriate for the two categories of objects.  Protection of information is more 
problematic than protection of forms of expression, from the perspective of the 
public interest.  When the legal system obstructs others from using the 
information, it obstructs everyone’s use of the trunk from which the branches 
grow, and not only the use of the branches themselves.  In contrast, when the 
law blocks competitors from using a particular form of expression in a given 
area, competitors may usually use other methods that are not protected, in 
order to achieve their goal.  Blocking the use of information therefore causes 
more serious harm to the overall social and economic interest, than blocking 
the use of a given form of expression. 
 
 147. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289 at 480, 488. 
 148. All types of information, without restriction, may be protected by the trade secret laws if 
they possess the characteristics that justify protection.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, § 39 (1995); Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (1985); Wiesner & Cava, supra 
note 2, at 1085-1090. 
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (1998). 
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A review of the arrangements applicable to intellectual property law 
reveals the different legal policies applied to the two categories of objects.  For 
example, within the framework of the Israeli system that adopted the 
institution of compulsory licenses, the patents registrar is vested with wide 
discretion to compel a patent owner to grant a license to another person to 
exploit the patent when he himself does not exploit it.150  In contrast, copyright 
law restricts the formation of compulsory licenses to considerably limited 
objects and purposes.151  Israeli trademark law also allows expropriation of 
rights on the ground of the public interest only in extreme circumstances.152 
In light of the caution with which the law should treat the protection of 
interests in information, the question arises whether it is justified to apply the 
misappropriation doctrine as a device for protecting information that is not 
protected either as a patent or as a trade secret.  Justices Barak and Strasberg-
Cohen in ASHIR clearly favored the position whereby commercial information 
might be protected in appropriate cases by the law of unjust enrichment even if 
it has been published.  The judges cited the American case law that protects the 
mode of calculating the Dow Jones index.153  Yet, a great deal of caution must 
be exercised in this context in view of the distinction drawn between the public 
interest in information and the public interest in the manner of expressing 
information.  This distinction has been elaborated within the framework of 
copyright law.  Copyright law does not give rise to a monopoly in favor of the 
owner, but rather provides him with a proprietary right that protects him 
against misappropriation by another.154  In this general sense therefore, 
copyright law resembles the law of unjust enrichment.155 
The distinction between an idea and an expression in copyright law derives 
from the perception that the dissemination of ideas should not be hampered, 
even if much labor has been invested in producing them.  This concept was 
 
 150. See SINNOTT, supra note 7. 
 151. See Copyright Ordinance, § 7a (1924) (Isr.).  See also Copyright Act, § 7a (1911) (Isr.). 
 152. Section 41 of the Trademarks Ordinance [New Version] M.H. 21 (1992) (Isr.) enables 
cancellation of the registration of a trademark for non-use, only if there was no bona fide 
intention to make use of the trademark and in fact there was no bona fide use of the trademark 
during the three years preceding the application for cancellation.  Even in such a case, the power 
to cancel the registration is qualified.  The provision does not apply where it is proved that there 
was no intention on the part of the owner to abandon the mark.  See id. at § 41. 
 153. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 434 (referring to Bd. of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. Dow Jones, 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983)). 
 154. GARNETT ET AL., supra note 39, at 392-397; GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 91, at 
§ 7.2. 
 155. Justice Cheshin noted in ASHIR that the intellectual property laws are, as a rule, largely 
based on the concept of preventing enrichment.  A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 399.  
Although such a proposition is far-reaching in relation to copyright law, where the cause of action 
is grounded on misappropriation as opposed to a claim for a monopoly, this stance may seem 
justified. 
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developed on the basis of the distinction between private and public interests.  
As noted, it does not rely on any formalities but on a flexible and fairly 
intuitive boundary line between those objects that should properly fall within 
the public domain and those that deserve proprietary protection.156  Thus when, 
in a given case, copyright law categorizes a certain object as an idea, it is 
expressing a powerful general policy that undoubtedly has ramifications 
reaching outside the framework of copyright law.  Are there any considerations 
that would lead to a different answer concerning the protection of given 
information if we were to pursue the balancing process within the framework 
of the law of unjust enrichment (the bypass path), as opposed to the copyright 
law (the institutionalized path)? 
Important differences may be observed as to the respective models of 
protection conferred on a given object within the framework of copyright law 
and the law of unjust enrichment.  Thus, copyright law imposes liability on the 
infringer even when the infringement is a one-time act.  In contrast, the unjust 
enrichment path, as it appears from ASHIR, will take into account whether 
single or repeated infringements have been committed.157  Likewise, copyright 
law imposes liability even when the infringement was not committed for a 
commercial purpose, but for personal use, for example.  It will sometimes be 
possible to raise a defense of fair use on such occasions.158  In contrast, the 
commercial or non-commercial nature of the activity will be a highly 
significant factor in relation to the cause of action for unjust enrichment.  
Additionally, the absence of appropriate alternative courses of action open to 
the defendant for achieving the same purpose is a factor that is disregarded in 
copyright law but is material to the cause of action for unjust enrichment.159 
In light of the in rem nature of copyright, the imposition of liability for 
infringement (being performed by violation of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner) is not dependent on any fault of the infringer.  Only in rare 
cases will the good faith of the infringer excuse him from liability.160  In 
contrast, considerations of guilt and lack of good faith have substantive 
 
 156. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 157. ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. at 479. 
 158. For an explanation of the fair use defense, see supra note 95. 
 159. ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. at 479-480.  See also supra Part VI-D. 
 160. In Israeli law, the defendant has to prove that he had no knowledge whatsoever that any 
person possessed a copyright in the work.  See Copyright Act, § 8 (1911) (Isr.).  In American law, 
the rule is that innocent intent does not constitute a defense in an infringement action, although it 
may reduce the statutory damages.  See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, § 13.08 (1963).  With regard to works which were distributed before the entry into 
force of the Bern Convention Implementation Amendments Act, the infringer of the right may be 
discharged in toto from damages, subject to judicial discretion, which resulted from activities 
carried out by him before to his knowledge of the infringement.  See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1994).  
See also Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes Inc., 29 F.3d 1529 (1994); Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1342-3 (1981). 
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importance within the context of the unjust enrichment (and the tort of 
negligence) bypass path.161  Moreover, the duration of protection under 
copyright law is significantly longer than that supplied under the bypass 
path.162 
The above remarks lead to the following recognition—the law of copyright 
is characterized by more stringent protection of the owner of an intellectual 
product than the law of unjust enrichment and the tort of negligence.  
Copyright laws’s rejection of the protection of ideas, so it might be argued, 
does not express a comprehensive rejection of the possibility of protecting 
ideas that are not protected by the institutionalized path.  Rather, it rejects the 
possibility of supplying intensified protection for ideas of the type afforded to 
copyright.  The copyright law does indeed transmit a certain general message 
regarding the status of public ideas, but it does not necessarily and 
conclusively negate the creation of a separate framework for protecting ideas 
under the law of unjust enrichment.  The latter operates different balances from 
those found in copyright law, and takes into account the message emanating 
from copyright law. 
The protection of published information, like the broader issue relating to 
the general relationship between institutionalized intellectual property and the 
law of unjust enrichment entails a dichotomy between two forms of protection 
accorded to intellectual products, each one possessing its own internal 
balances.  The former supplies a powerful protection; the latter confers a fluid, 
amorphous, and less powerful protection that is dependent on the special given 
circumstances.  Yet, the possibility of supplying protection to the interests in 
published information by virtue of the bypass path or misappropriation 
doctrine, need not undermine the sharp distinction that should be drawn from 
the perspective of the balancing process between the two different categories 
of intellectual products—ideas (and information) on one hand, forms of 
expression, on the other.  As noted previously, protection of ideas might 
seriously affect competition and social development.  Indeed, it would seem 
that in this context, too, there is little choice but to leave a margin for the 
development of appropriate protection by means of the misappropriation 
doctrine.  At the same time, in view of the caution that must be exercised in 
this context, such protection must only be granted in exceptional cases, in 
contrast to the more liberal approach, which may be applied regarding the 
prohibition on the imitation of a mode of expression, such as an imitation of an 
unregistered design. 
 
 161. See supra Part VI-A. 
 162. The regular period of copyright protection, both in American and Israeli law is the life of 
the author and 70 years after his death.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a); Copyright Ordinance, § 5(4) (1924) 
P.L. vol. 1, 289 (Em.) (Isr.).  For the period of protection according to the ASHIR rule, see supra 
notes 142-143 and accompanying text. 
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It may be added that the view whereby extra care must be taken in relation 
to blocking the use of ideas, as distinct from blocking the use of a mode of 
expression, has been echoed in the stance taken by Justice Barak in ASHIR.  
He indicated that one of the factors to be considered in defining the extra 
element within the framework of the bypass path should be whether it was 
possible for the defendant to develop a product that is functionally similar to 
the original product, without imitating the original design.163  This position 
reflects the view that if a number of modes of expressing the functional idea 
exist, the functional idea will possibly not be protected within the framework 
of the bypass path, although the concrete mode of expression (the given 
pattern) will be protected.  In the latter case, the competitor will be sent off to 
generate his own alternative mode of expression. 
In light of this background, it would be worthwhile to examine the 
application of the misappropriation doctrine in American law in the matter of 
International News Service v. Associated Press.164  In that case, the defendant 
was a news agency operating in the western part of the United States, which 
made use of news items gathered by the plaintiff, also a news agency, and 
published by the plaintiff in the eastern part of the United States.  The 
defendant sold these news items to newspapers that were members of its 
organization in the west.  These newspapers competed with other newspapers 
located in the west that worked with the plaintiff.165 
This case is special for a number of reasons that justify affording 
protection to the plaintiff within the context of the misappropriation doctrine 
even if one accepts the approach described previously, namely that the 
misappropriation of published ideas that are not protected by the 
institutionalized route should only be prevented in unusual circumstances, in 
contrast to the position relating to modes of expression.  First, the reference in 
International News Service is not merely to ideas, but to abstract merchandise 
of the news type.  Trading in this type of merchandise is the principal business 
of the plaintiff and it is of value for only a limited period of time.  The public 
interest in the swift flow of news is balanced by the need to properly reimburse 
those who gather the news items by means of short-term protection of their 
investment in obtaining that information.  The absence of protection would 
lead to a market failure that the bypass route seeks to prevent.  Second, it might 
be possible to classify this type of situation, albeit with some difficulties, 
within the institutionalized route of the trade secrets laws.  Even though these 
news items were published in the eastern United States, they were still not 
known in the western United States, and in this sense they were secret 
information in the west.  It is a principle of trade secrets law that information 
 
 163. ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. at 479-480. 
 164. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 165. Id. at 238. 
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may amount to a trade secret even if it has been published in a partial manner.  
It is sufficient to show relative secrecy.166  So long as no general knowledge 
exists regarding the particular information, economic value attaches to not 
publishing the information in the possession of the plaintiff.  Protection might 
be accorded, in principle, to the owner’s interest.167  Thus, in practice, the 
previously mentioned case is not concerned with ideas that have been 
sufficiently “published.” 
VIII.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE IN ASHIR 
In order to properly assess the approach that the Supreme Court of Israel 
adopted toward the misappropriation doctrine in ASHIR (the bypass path), it is 
necessary to examine how this doctrine was actually implemented in practice 
in the case.  A detailed examination of this type reveals what weight the court 
assigned to the various elements affecting the balance of interests, as these 
have been described previously.168  Such an examination enables the 
assessment of the efficiency of the working tools offered by this court ruling, 
concerning the application of the misappropriation doctrine.  ASHIR 
considered three types of intellectual products within the context of various 
applications for interlocutory injunctions that were submitted by several 
plaintiffs against competitors who had imitated the plaintiffs’ products. 
A. The Bathroom Accessories Affair 
One claim was filed by the manufacturers, importers and exclusive 
distributors of plastic bathroom accessories against a competitor who had 
copied these products including a soap holder, toilet-roll holder, toothbrush 
holder and towel rail.  These products did not bear the mark of the 
manufacturer and no intellectual property right had been registered for them.  
Justice Cheshin rejected the applicants’ contention that these products should 
be protected, in view of his position that a broad negative arrangement 
envelops the institutionalized intellectual property law.  It had been possible to 
register a design in this case, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to circumvent 
the institutionalized path by means of unjust enrichment law, unless they could 
prove unusual circumstances.  Justice Cheshin could not find such unusual 
 
 166. See, e.g., Q-Co Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Riteoff, 
Inc. v. Contact Industries, Inc., 43 A.D. 2d 731, 732 (1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §39 cmt. f (1995); Brandon B. Cate, Saforo & Assocs., Inc. v. Porocel Corp.: The 
Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Confused Status of Common 
Law Trade Secrets Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687, 708-709 (2000); JAGER, supra note 34. 
 167. For the requirement that the trade secret should possess “economic value,” see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §39 cmt. f (1995).  Similarly, this element can 
be defined as relating to the “economic advantage” that should derive from the secrecy.  See 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 4 (1985). 
 168. Supra Part VI. 
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circumstances in the case at bar.169  Justice Englard, too, rejected the 
application for an interlocutory injunction in view of his general position that 
the existence of an external cause of action is needed in order to assert 
protection under the law of unjust enrichment.170 
The other five judges, who favored applying the misappropriation doctrine 
in Israeli law, nonetheless rejected the applicants’ contentions in this case, after 
balancing the factors relevant to this doctrine in accordance with the criteria 
developed in ASHIR.  Regarding the distributors, Justice Strasberg-Cohen 
believed that no extra element whatsoever had been proved that would justify 
upholding their expectation of exclusivity.  Regarding the manufacturer, no 
originality or innovation had been proved nor was there sufficient evidence to 
show that the applicant had indeed developed the design of the products.  
Further, it had not been proved that investments had been devoted to 
developing the products, nor had clarification been offered as to why the 
design had not been registered.171  In dismissing the application, Chief Justice 
Barak emphasized the absence of proof in relation to the following facts: the 
extent of the investment in developing the products, the ease or difficulty in 
making the copy, the length of time during which the product had been 
marketed without competition, the degree of innovation and importance of the 
product, and the degree of awareness of the copy.172  Justice Barak did not 
regard this as an easy case in view of the fact that the copying had apparently 
been systematic and the competitor had alternative ways of designing the 
products that would not have impaired the functional characteristics of the 
products.  In the absence of sufficient facts, Justice Barak decided to deny the 
application for an interlocutory injunction, although he made it clear that the 
ultimate result might be different following a hearing of the claim on the 
merits.173  Justice Barak’s remarks indicated greater support for the applicants’ 
position than that shown by Justice Strasberg-Cohen as well as a greater 
struggle with the decision.  Justice Strasberg-Cohen ascribed particularly high 
significance to the prima facie possibility of registering the design, as a factor 
operating against the application.174  The remaining judges concurred in 
dismissing the application in relation to the bathroom accessories.  Justice 
Zamir concurred with the reasons given by Justice Strasberg-Cohen, Justice Or 
concurred with the reasons given by Justice Barak, and Justice S. Levin 
concurred with the result and emphasized the possibility of registering 
institutionalized intellectual property in the circumstances of the case.175 
 
 169. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 387. 
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 174. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 435-33. 
 175. Id. at 502. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE “MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE” 543 
Apparently, tilting the balance in this case was the view that the products 
were simple and lacked any truly unique attributes.  Because the court did not 
find sufficient evidence to support the substantive aspects of the application, it 
is not surprising that it dismissed the petition for an interlocutory injunction.  A 
person seeking protection within the context of the bypass path bears the onus 
of proving the elements that would tend to tilt that balancing process in his 
favor.  In this sense, the establishment of the bypass route also leaves intact the 
incentive to follow the institutionalized path.  During the litigation stage, the 
applicant carries the burden of investing money to collect economic evidence 
and expert opinions in order to prove the existence of the extra element, funds 
that he would not necessarily invest if he held institutionalized intellectual 
property rights.176 
B. The Cutting Block Systems 
In this case, the applicant had developed a system for molding and cutting 
aluminum.  The owner of a workshop copied the cutting blocks.  In view of 
their basic reluctance to adopt the bypass route as described above, Justices 
Cheshin and Englard rejected the ensuing application for an interlocutory 
injunction.  However, among the five other judges who supported the 
misappropriation doctrine, a dispute arose concerning the outcome of 
implementing this doctrine on the facts of the case.  Four of the judges thought 
an interlocutory injunction should be granted; the fifth judge thought it should 
not.  Justice Strasberg-Cohen reached the conclusion that protection should be 
accorded to the developer of the cutting block, as this was the fruit of an 
original development and prolonged effort, and the imitation was slavish.177  
She took this view despite her general position that the owner of an intellectual 
product has to supply an explanation as to why he failed to register an 
intellectual property when he could have done so.  Indeed, her decision did not 
allude to this issue.  Justices Barak, Or and Zamir based the grant of an 
interlocutory order on the following considerations: the fact that a copy had 
also been made of the visual form of the product, the novelty of the product, 
the extent of the investment in development, the comprehensiveness of the 
copy, the use of the copy for competitive purposes, and the defendants’ 
knowledge that they were copying the fruit of the applicant’s development.178  
In contrast to these judges, Justice S. Levin believed an explanation was 
necessary for the failure to register the intellectual property.  In the absence of 
 
 176. When the intellectual property, such as a patent, has to be registered, the applicant must 
invest monies at the stage of the registration to prove that the object qualifies for registration. 
 177. A.L.A. 5768/94, ASHIR, 52(4) P.D. 289, 436-37. 
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such an explanation, no interlocutory order could be granted.179  By a majority 
of four to three, the court therefore granted the order. 
The court’s decision in this case clearly illustrates the limited weight 
assigned to the need for explaining the failure to register intellectual property, 
as argued previously by this author.  When the other factors are strong, they 
will override this element.  Thus, of the five proponents of the 
misappropriation doctrine, only one judge opined that the need to give an 
adequate explanation for failure to register overrode the other considerations 
justifying conferral of protection upon the owner of the product. 
C. The Picture Album Affair 
This case concerned a system for soldering and binding picture albums. 
The applicant had developed the system through a third party.  The defendant 
used the same system after purchasing similar soldering machines from the 
same third party.  He subsequently sold albums prepared by this method at a 
cheaper price than asked for by the applicant.  The applicant filed for a patent; 
however, no patent was registered, and it was unclear whether one would be 
registered at a later date.180  All seven judges dismissed the application for an 
interlocutory injunction.  Justices Cheshin and Englard did so in view of their 
basic rejection of the misappropriation doctrine, as described above.  Justice S. 
Levin did so again in view of the greater weight he accorded the absence of 
good reasons for not registering the institutionalized intellectual property.181  
Justice Strasberg-Cohen did not find a sufficient factual basis for the 
interlocutory injunction, as it was unclear at this stage who possessed rights in 
the manufacturing process.182  Further, the album did not enjoy a unique status 
in the market.  Justice Zamir concurred with this conclusion and pointed out 
that the fact that sales were being carried out at a lower price did not comprise 
an extra element.183  Chief Justice Barak (joined by Justice Or) reached the 
same conclusion on the basis of similar considerations.  In addition to the lack 
of clarity regarding the identity of the person who had developed the process 
under discussion, Chief Justice Barak noted that no evidence had been adduced 
regarding the investments in developing the product and as to whether the 
divergence in price ensued from savings in the costs of development.184  
Likewise, Justice Barak pointed out that the product had been available in the 
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market for about three years and therefore, it was likely that the applicants had 
already recovered their research and development costs.185 
In conclusion, the ASHIR rule established a structured and orderly “road 
map” for the misappropriation doctrine.  This is a road map of balances that 
may be operated by a court in a practical manner and that removes intuition as 
the sole basis for making such decisions.  In so doing, the road map reduces 
legal uncertainty.  Naturally, the relative weight of the factors that must be 
taken into account cannot easily be established, and when some of the factors 
lean to one side and some to another, the level of uncertainty will be 
considerable.  However, occasionally, the factors will point in the same 
direction, and in these cases, predicting the legal outcome will be more feasible 
than anticipated. 
IX.  CONCLUSION: THE ISRAELI MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE 
It is not surprising that the misappropriation doctrine has been the subject 
of sharp controversy in American law.  The ASHIR rule, which was established 
in Israel in 1998, also attracted intense criticism within the Israeli legal system.  
Perhaps unexpectedly, academia and those in the legal practice have joined 
forces, albeit for different reasons.  One frequent argument by practitioners has 
been that this rule leads to acute uncertainty in relation to the protection of 
intellectual products and the development of new products and that it causes 
serious harm to competitiveness.  From a different angle, legal scholars 
frequently criticize the meager weight this doctrine accords social and cultural 
developments, arguing that it blocks ideas and expressions that should be in the 
public domain.186 
The misappropriation doctrine operates on two axes.  On one axis is the 
protection of moral values (respecting the protection of the developer’s labor 
against a parasitical free-rider) and at the other end of the scale, considerations 
of economic efficiency (maximum protection of competitiveness).  The second 
axis concerns the protection of private property versus the promotion of public 
interests.  The ASHIR ruling should be assessed in light of general trends in 
Israeli law regarding these two axes.  As mentioned above, the Israeli legal 
system has traditionally preferred moral considerations over those relating to 
economic efficiency; however, Israeli case law has recently begun to attribute 
some weight to efficiency considerations.187  On the axis between the private 
and the public interests it is possible to identify more obvious developmental 
trends.  There are judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court that have begun 
implementing theories regarding the social responsibility imposed upon the 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
546 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:503 
property owner and that require him to accept a fairly significant impairment 
of his property rights for the benefit of society.  This is the case, for example, 
in relation to derogation in the value of land caused by new urban zoning 
plans.188  The concept imposing social responsibility upon a property owner 
was developed by legislation also in the context of the relationship between the 
owners of apartments in a condominium.  A special majority of owners may 
now decide on the installation of an elevator in a condominium, despite the 
generally protected in rem right of the minority to preserve the existing basic 
status of the common property.189  This is also the case in relation to the 
appropriation of part of the common property, by virtue of a special majority’s 
decision, in order to expand apartments within the building.190  This legislation 
thus restricts the veto right of an individual owner, based upon his in rem 
rights, to block the development and modernization of the condominium.  It 
imposes upon each individual the burden to realize his social responsibility 
towards the public interest of the owners in the condominiums expressed in the 
majority decision.191 
In the same spirit, one may also point to the fundamental willingness of the 
Israeli Supreme Court to subordinate the protection of private property to the 
general obligation of good faith, albeit with great caution.192  This decision 
weakens the intensity of the protection conferred on property in the face of 
opposing values.  Recently, this trend was highlighted when a bench of seven 
judges of the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the principle of “distributive 
 
 188. Thus, C.A. 3901/96, The Local Committee for Planning and Building Ra’anana v. 
Horowitz, 56(4) P.D. 913 concerned a new city building plan that reduced the value of the 
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justice” in the important case of Association in Favor of the Democratic 
Discourse v. Minister of National Infrastructure.193 
This weakening of property rights in favor of public interests is continuing 
to evolve in Israel notwithstanding the constitutional protection accorded to 
property in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, adopted in 1992.194  The 
dynamic force of the concept of social responsibility has succeeded in 
overriding the opposing trend operating in the Israeli legal system following 
the elevation of property rights to a constitutional level.  It is worth adding that 
this legal trend has not been supported by comparable social developments in 
Israel but is largely a reaction to conflicting social approaches evolving in the 
country.  In recent years, Israeli society has been undergoing a visible process 
of disintegration, a deepening of economic divisions and a shift towards 
achievement-orientation and individualism.195  Against this background, it is 
possible to regard the legal development of the concepts of social 
responsibility and distributive justice as part of a judicial initiative that seeks to 
hamper these aberrant trends and increase social solidarity in Israel.196 
In this author’s view, the Supreme Court of Israel has adopted, within the 
context of the misappropriation doctrine, an approach that draws a proper 
balance between the protection of private property interests and public 
interests.  A just society cannot disregard the basic moral imperative that “he 
who sows shall reap,” and it must afford suitable protection to the expectations 
of the developer of a new intellectual property.  The misappropriation doctrine 
is founded upon solid moral considerations that do not allow the free 
appropriation of a person’s private property and the fruit of his labors.  Yet, 
private property rights are not absolute; rather they are subject, in Israel as in 
other legal systems, to the principle of social responsibility.  The duty of an 
individual to act responsibly towards society leads to the conclusion that when 
he does not “pay his dues” to society by means of the contract embodied in the 
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establishment of institutionalized intellectual property,197 he should not be 
afforded all-embracing protection against its appropriation.  He should be 
exposed to a significant level of risk that will lead society and the public to 
gain substantial advantages in terms of increasing society’s fund of knowledge 
and strengthening competitiveness.  The Supreme Court of Israel, in its 
fundamental and comprehensive judgment in ASHIR, laid the foundations for 
the proper balancing process that must be pursued in this context.  The 
American misappropriation doctrine, which some believed has already “given 
up the ghost,”198 is still alive and well in the Israeli legal system, and in this 
author’s view, long may it thrive. 
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